Enthusiasts of the “Grand Theft Auto” video game might think that “petty theft auto” sounds rather wimpy, but to a felon car thief seeking a sentence reduction under Proposition 47, “petty theft auto” sounds pretty good after the decision in People v. Ortiz, case no. H042062 (6th Dist., Jan. 8, 2016), Prop 47, adopted by the voters in 2014, reduced certain drug and theft offenses to misdemeanors and allowed those previously sentenced for those crimes as felonies to petition for resentencing if the crime would have been a misdemeanor if Prop 47 had been in effect. In Ortiz, the statute violated by the defendant was Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), which reads in part: Any person who…
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- Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Jurisdiction, Prop 47 Reductions, Wende Review
Third District Court of Appeal creates a “quagmire” regarding Prop 47 sentence reductions
You don’t have to take my word for it. The court uses the word “quagmire” in yesterday’s decision in People v. Scarbrough, case no. C075414 (3d. Dist. Sept. 29, 2015), in which it holds that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to recall and reduce sentences under Proposition 47 when the judgment for those crimes is on appeal. First, a brief reminder of what the California electorate voted into law last November. Prop 47 reclassifies certain crimes from felonies to misdemeanors and provides that persons convicted of felonies that are now classified as misdemeanors may “petition for a recall of sentence” to request resentencing under the new standards. You can imagine there are quite…
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The implications on appeal of “clarified” trial court orders
It drives me crazy when an adverse party asks the trial court to “clarify” a recent ruling. Too often, such a request is not a request for clarification at all, but instead an effort to expand the scope of the order or otherwise change its meaning. Funny how these requests for “clarification” are brought up after an attorney realizes he neglected to make an argument, ask for a specific form of relief, or prejudiced his client’s interest by an admission in court. Such was the case in In re Christopher B., case no. C077467 (3rd Dist. Sept. 28, 2015), a “Murphy conservatorship” proceeding. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 5000, et seq., 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B), 5361;…
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Bad news for post-conviction indigent appellants: No right to Wende review
A California criminal defendant entitled to appellate counsel appointed by the state has one trick up his sleeve that defendants who hire their own counsel don’t: Wende review. When an appellant’s appointed counsel provides the Court of Appeal with a brief setting forth the substantive and procedural facts and informing the court that counsel has reviewed the record and can find no basis for challenging the judgment, the Court of Appeal must independently review the record for prejudicial error warranting reversal. This process is required in order to assure that the indigent appellant is not deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. But is an indigent appellant with appointed counsel entitled…
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Ineffective assistance of counsel in advising waiver of right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel
When a plea agreement includes a waiver of rights to appeal, claim ineffective assistance of counsel, and to move to withdraw the plea, can it logically be enforced to preclude a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the advice to enter into the agreement? Last week, in People v. Orozco, case no. F056712, (5th Dist. Ja. 8, 2010), the court of appeal joins several federal courts in reaching the only sensible answer: of course not. To hold such a waiver enforceable “would deprive a defendant of the ‘opportunity to assert his Sixth Amendment right to counsel where he had accepted the waiver in reliance on delinquent representation.’ ” [Citation.] We agree…
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When the Attorney General agrees with you
Respondents sometimes must concede minor points along the way while arguing that such points do not require reversal. But seldom does one see the respondent agree that a judgment is even partially reversible. One is more likely to see it in a criminal appeal than in a civil appeal, especially when the criminal appeal involves errors in sentencing, as in People v. Frausto, case no. B212054 (2d Dist. Dec. 28, 2009), where the attorney general agreed that the trial court erred in imposing three cumulative 5-year sentencing enhancements under Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for each of three prior serious felony convictions tried in a single proceeding and that…
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Patrol Cars are Traffic, Too
Image via Wikipedia In People v. Logsdon, case no. G038366 (4th Dist. May 28, 2008, ordered published June 24, 2008), the defendant contended that the officer following him on an otherwise nearly deserted street in the middle of the night lacked cause to stop his vehicle after defendant crossed several lanes of traffic without signaling. Defendant contended that in the absence of other traffic, his unsignaled lane change was a safe move. He forgot about the patrol car following him! The court holds that the officer who made the stop constituted traffic that needed warning of the lane change. There’s an interesting angle to this case from an appellate perspective…
- Appellate Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Standing to Appeal, Statutory Construction, Waiver of Issues
Court has No Duty During Recommitment Proceedings to Consider Suitability for Outpatient Treatment
In People v. Rish, case no. B198727 (2d Dist. June 16, 2008), Rish appealed from from an order recommitting him to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code section 2972. He claimed that the trial court erred by failing to consider whether he was suitable for outpatient treatment, even though he did not raise this alternative in the trial court. The Court of Appeal determines that Rish waived the issue by failing to raise it. As a matter of statutory construction, Section 2972, subdivision (d) does not impose a duty on the court to evaluate suitability for outpatient treatment sua sponte. The court reached the…
- Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Federal Procedure, Plea Bargains, Sentencing, Waiver of Issues
Waiver of Appeal Rights in Plea Agreements
Plea agreements often waive the right to appeal, but they aren’t always what they seem, especially when it comes to how they define the scope of the waiver. For a lesson in how to determine whether a defendant has waived the right to bring a particular appeal, check out United States v. Cope, case no. 06-50441 (9th Cir. June 4, 2008). Cope pled guilty to a single count of possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment and lifetime supervised release. His plea agreement stated that he waived appeal of his sentence so long as it met three criteria. On appeal, he challenged the length of his…
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Ninth Circuit Amends Garcia on Appellate Jurisdiction
According to Ninth Circuit Blog, the Ninth Circuit “came to its jurisdictional senses” with its amended opinion in U.S. v. Garcia, case no. 05-30356 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2007, amended Apr. 17, 2008). While I might have said that a little more gently, I agree with the sentiment. I covered the relevant holding regarding appellate jurisdiction in my original coverage: The two defendants challenging their sentences in this case claimed that the trial court erred even though the sentences imposed were within the ranges stipulated in their respective plea agreements made under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). Both defendants contended that the trial court’s miscalculation under the sentencing guidelines…
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Thorough Confusion Deprives Defendant of Right to Counsel
Confusion abounds lately. On the heels of my last post about a “hopelessly ambiguous” jury verdict comes a decision requiring reversal because the proceedings left the parties and trial court so “throughly confused” that the defendant was deprived of his right to counsel: People v. Earp, case no. B201309 (2d Dist. Mar 11, 2008). The trouble began when Earp tried to withdraw his no contest plea to possession of methamphetamine for sale. The trouble requiring reversal, that is. The real trouble started while Earp was released pending sentencing. He violated three conditions of his probation (from another offense) and then failed to appear for sentencing. He was arrested and convicted…
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A Simple “Yes” or “No” Will Do, Thank You
As soon as I glanced at United States v. Rodriguez, case no. 07-10217 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2008) today and realized I would have to defer drafting a blog post until later, I had a pretty good idea I was going to be preempted, and I was pretty sure by whom. Sure enough, California Appellate Report and Decision of the Day both have excellent posts on the case, so I’ll just briefly explain the case and then use my fellow bloggers’ posts as starting points for my discussion. The issue is this: if a person in custody gives an ambiguous response when asked if he waives his Miranda rights, is…
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Be Careful with those Plea Agreements
Be very, very careful with the language of your plea agreement. After all, it’s a contract, and deserves the same careful consideration before entering into it. You might live to regret it, even if it takes 20 years for it to catch up with you, as happened to the defendant in People v. Paredes, case no. D050150 (4th Dist. Feb. 26, 2008). Paredes, a legally resident alien, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in 1987 in part because the prosecutor agreed to a “JRAD” — a judicial recommendation against deportation — that, under 1987 federal law, precluded the government from removing him from the country on the basis of the conviction.…
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Parolee May Get Private Counseling without Waiving Privilege
Where parole is conditioned on the parolee receiving psycotherapy (in this case, because of the sexual nature of the offense), and the parolee retains a private therapist in addition to using state-provided therapy, is the parolee required to waive the psychotherapist-patient privilege regarding the private therapist in order to remain on parole? The state in In re Corona, case no. B197023 (2d Dist. Feb. 20, 2008) insisted that the parolee must waive the privilege. The Court of Appeal says otherwise. The court found that Corona should be commended, rather than threatened, for seeking additional therapy, at least absent the state’s ability to identify a “nefarious reason” that he did so.…
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Challenge to Post-Plea Sentencing Procedure does not Require Certificate of Probable Cause
After being found mentally competent to stand trial, Rodney Oglesby pleaded guilty to committing domestic violence, aggravated assault and — worst of all, or at least co-equal with his other crimes, at least according to PETA — killing a kitten. The competency finding was based, per the stipulation of the parties, on just one of the psychiatric reports. The other psychiatrist opined he was incompetent. Oglesby fought his court-appointed attorney every step of the way. He asked for, and was denied, new counsel, then accepted a plea deal offered by the People, in which his lawyer refused to join. In fact, his lawyer insisted that Oglesby was not competent. He…
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A Philosophical Link between Golf and Sentencing Reform
Who’d have thought? But the Sentencing Law and Policy blog spots the link in the 2008 revisions to the Rules of Golf. Hint (especially for you non-golfers): the Rules of Golf can be hard to understand and are chock full of penalties for various infractions.
- Appellate Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Double Jeopardy, Standard of Review, Waiver of Issues
Double Jeopardy Argument Not Waived by Failure to Object to Multiplicitous Convictions and Sentences
In U.S. v. Zalapa, case no. 06-50487 (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2007), the Ninth Circuit holds that a defendant can raise a double jeopardy challenge to his multiplicitous convictions and sentences on appeal even if he fails to object to them in the district court. Zapala was charged with two counts — possession of an unregistered machine gun and possession of an unregistered firearm with a barrel less than 16 inches long — under the same statute, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Catch is, those counts were based on possession of the same gun. Zapala did not object to the indictment, pleaded guilty to all charges without a plea agreement, and…
- Appellate Procedure, Articles by Greg May, Confrontation Clause, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Federal Procedure, Standard of Review
“Confronting Confrontation”
That’s the title given by the Los Angeles Daily Journal to my article, which it published in its November 19, 2007 issue, regarding U.S. v. Larson, the en banc Ninth Circuit’s confusing “resolution” of the perceived split of authority on the standard of review in Confrontation Clause challenges based on limitations on cross-examination. The article (PDF link) grew out of this blog post giving my initial impressions about the case on the day it was published. I followed up that post with another providing links to some other blog coverage of the case.
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Is a Sentence within the Range Stipulated in a Plea Agreement Appealable?
UPDATE (4/23/08): The holding described in this post was changed by the court’s amended opinion of April 17, 2008). See my coverage. The Ninth Circuit rejects such a challenge in U.S. v. Garcia, case no. 05-30356 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2007), at least where the plea agreement was not contingent on the sentencing guidelines and the only error asserted was a miscalculation of the guidelines or failure to properly consider the factors in Title 18 United States Code section 3553. The two defendants challenging their sentences in this case claimed that the trial court erred even though the sentences imposed were within the ranges stipulated in their respective plea agreements…
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An Arrest Warrant is an Arrest Warrant is an Arrest Warrant
At least, when it comes to whether the police may enter a residence when executing it. In U.S. v. Gooch, case no. 06-30645 (9th Cir. Nov. 1, 2007), the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was arrested when reaching for firearms during the execution of a warrant for the search of his residence. He claimed the search warrant was invalid because it was based on police officers’ observation of drug paraphernalia when they got out of their express van and entered the residence to execute an arrest warrant for Gooch’s roommate. Gooch contended that because the arrest warrant was only a misdemeanor bench…
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John Doe Arrest Warrant Based on DNA Satisfies Statute of Limitations
In People v. Robinson, case no. C044703 (3d Dist. Oct. 26, 2007), the court of appeal holds that a “John Doe” arrest warrant that describes the person to be seized by DNA profile suffices to “commence” a prosecution for purposes of the statute of limitations for a sexual offense. Penal Code Section 804, subdivision (d) provides that a felony prosecution is “commenced” when “[a]n arrest warrant or bench warrant is issued, provided the warrant names or describes the defendant with the same degree of particularity required for an indictment, information, or complaint.” (Emphasis added.) The DNA profile in this case satisfies the state and federal constitutional requirements that the warrant…
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CALCRIM No. 3450 Survives Appellate Challenge
CALCRIM No. 3450 is a long instruction that that sets forth the defendant’s burden of proof on insanity. Its very length and comprehensiveness appear to be what saves it in People v. Thomas, case no. C052849 (3d Dist. Oct. 22, 2007). The instruction includes this paragraph: If you conclude that at times the defendant was legally sane and other times the defendant was insane, you must assume that he was legally sane when he committed the crime. Because virtually every mentally ill person has lucid moments, contended the defendant, this language in the instruction essentially directs a finding of sanity. According to defendant, the instruction “require[d] [the] jury to find…
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No Cert for Sentencing Cases
Federal Public Defender Steve Sady has a thoughtful and detailed post at Ninth Circuit Blog on SCOTUS’s denial of certiorari in three important sentencing cases.
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Summary Rejection of Plea Agreement is Error
It’s not often that you see an opinion on a writ petition start with a statement that the trial court erred but the writ is denied. The reason for that sort of introduction in Morgan v. U.S. District Court (D.Ariz.), case no. 07-70201 (9th Cir. Oct. 9, 2007), is because the petitioner sought just a little more relief than he was entitled to. Morgan accepted a plea agreement that included a sentencing term pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C). So far, so good. The stipulated sentence was near the upper limit of the guidelines but the district court opined that an upward departure may be appropriate. This led…
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DNA Collection Survives Another Constitutional Challenge
DNA collection while on supervised release is constitutional, even if the terms of supervised release in your original sentence did not provide for it and the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (“DNA Act”), which mandates it, became effective only after you were sentenced. In United States v. Lujan, case no. 02-30237 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 2007), the court rejects arguments that collection under these circumstances violates the Fourth Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause, constitutes an unlawful bill of attainder, and violates the separation of powers. Lujan’s appeal was stayed pending the outcome in two other appeals, and the outcomes of those cases allow the Ninth to dispose easily of…
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What Makes a Necessarily Included Offense?
In People v. Murphy, case no. C046923 (3d Dist. August 29, 2007, modified Sept. 25, 2007), the defendant contended that she was “improperly convicted for both selling the cocaine rock in count one and possessing that same rock for sale in count two, a necessarily included offense.” The record showed that the defendant was actually accused of possessing two cocaine rocks and did not show upon which rock the jury founded the conviction on the count for possession for sale. The court concludes the conviction on multiple counts was proper because the applicable test — whether the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of…
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Vindictive Prosecution Dismissal Gets De Novo Review
If you had been stopped twice at the U.S. – Mexican border trying to smuggle in illegal immigrants, told the customs officer both times that you had been paid to drive the vehicle across the border — and in one case admitted that you knew the compensation was for alien smuggling — and you weren’t prosecuted in either instance, you might figure that when you are prosecuted — this time, for trying to bring marijuana across the border — you’re better off explaining that you thought you were smuggling aliens instead of marijuana. That’s exactly how Sharon Ann Jenkins testified in her own defense at trial. While the jury was…
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CALCRIM No. 226 Survives Appellate Challenge
In People v. Wamer, case no. F051027 (5th Dist. Sept. 12, 2007), the Court of Appeal holds that CALCRIM No. 226 does not impermissibly lighten the prosecutor’s burden of proof. Wamer, convicted of murder, contended that the last paragraph of the instruction lightened the prosecutor’s burden by its use of the words in bold italics in the below excerpt (emphasis added), the last paragraph of the instruction: If you decide that a witness deliberately lied about something significant in this case, you should consider not believing anything that witness says. Or, if you think the witness lied about some things, but told the truth about others, you may simply accept…
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Ninth Upholds Death Penalty Despite Jury’s Reference to Bible during Penalty Phase Deliberations
Stevie Lamar Fields was convicted in California state court of heinous crimes, including murder, which he committed in the course of a three-week spree that he started just two weeks after completing a prison stretch for manslaughter. During the penalty phase of his trial, the jury foreman consulted a Bible, a dictionary, and other reference texts, made notes of points for and against the death penalty, then shared those notes with the jury. The foreman’s notes in favor of the death penalty included Biblical passages. Fields was sentenced to death. The District Court denied habeas relief on the conviction but granted it as to the death penalty. The Ninth Circuit’s…
- Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Double Jeopardy, Federal Procedure
Expansive Congressional Authorization for Government Appeals in Criminal Cases
In U.S. v. Stanton, case. no. 06-10519 (9th Cir. August 31, 2007), Stanton was convicted by a U. S. Magistrate Judge in a bench trial. He appealed to the District Court, which reversed his conviction. The government appealed from the District Court order. Stanton makes a two-pronged challenge to the government’s right to appeal. First, he contends that jurisdiction is lacking because the government may appeal only where authorized by Congress and the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 USC §3731, does not explicitly authorize the government to appeal from a district court order reversing a conviction entered by a magistrate and ordering an entry of acquittal. Right on both counts, says…