As I’ve mentioned before, the standard of review is not always clear. One sometimes has to “drill down” past the obvious, and the “abuse of discretion” standard is full of nuance. The parties’ briefs may even fight over which is the correct standard of review to apply, or the cases may be split on the issue. Sometimes, where the standard is in dispute, it doesn’t matter, because the outcome is the same under either standard. There is no question as to what standard of review applies in yesterday’s decision in Carlson v. Home Team Pest Defense, Inc., case no. A142219 (1st Dist., August 17, 2015), but the case nonetheless has a lesson in…
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A break for some shipmates and a lesson on drilling down on the standard of review
As a graduate of the “Boat School” (or “Canoe U”), I went on alert as soon as I spotted a case in yesterday’s advance sheets regarding whether some local county employees’ time as U.S. Naval Academy Midshipmen (don’t call them “middies”) could enhance their county retirement credits. My shipmates came out on the winning end of things, and the opinion offers a lesson on appellate procedure. The issue in Lanquist v. Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (case no. B251179, 2d. Dist., March 16, 2015) is succinctly stated in the first paragraph of the opinion: Ventura County Employees’ Retirement Association (VCERA) permits employees to purchase retirement service credit for time spent…
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Attorney fee review standard isn’t always abuse of discretion
Appealing from an attorney fee award is usually a tough slog. Unless you are arguing a pure issue of law, such as whether any attorney fee-shifting statute applies to the case at all, the Court of Appeal usually reviews only for abuse of discretion. However, an important exception is noted in the recent case of Samantha C. v. State Department of Developmental Services, case no. B232649 (2d Dist., Div. 1, June 21, 2012). In Samantha C., attorney fees were sought under the “private attorney general statute,” Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, in which plaintiffs who enforce an “an important right affecting the public interest” can recover attorney fees under certain…
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Who Says CRC 8.108(f)(1) is for Cross-Appeals Only?
Certainly not Division Three of the Fourth District Court of Appeal. In The Termo Co. v. Luther, case no. G038435 (Dec. 17, 2008), the court holds that the rule of court allowing the 20-day window for “any other party to appeal from the same judgment or order,” triggered by the clerk’s mailing of the notice of the filing of an appeal, means just what it says, notwithstanding its “Cross-appeal” heading. Termo and Angus Development Corporation were co-petitioners in the administrative writ proceedings. The trial court denied the writ. Termo filed its notice of appeal from the judgment on the 59th day following service of notice of entry of judgment —…
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What Constitutes Extrinsic Evidence that Changes the Standard of Review?
Well-established, seemingly clear principles like contract interpretation being a matter of law (absent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to resolve), and de novo review of legal questions aren’t always so clear in practice. California National Bank v. Woodbridge Plaza, LLC, case no. G038623 (4th Dist. May 30, 2008, ordered published June 20, 2008) is a case in point. At issue was the meaning of a lease provision that determined the maximum rent for the extended term. The landlord, who prevailed at the bench trial, contended that the court’s interpretation of the lease was governed by substantial evidence review because there was conflicting opinion testimony on the meaning of the lease provision.…
- Appellate Procedure, Criminal Procedure, Standing to Appeal, Statutory Construction, Waiver of Issues
Court has No Duty During Recommitment Proceedings to Consider Suitability for Outpatient Treatment
In People v. Rish, case no. B198727 (2d Dist. June 16, 2008), Rish appealed from from an order recommitting him to the California Department of Mental Health for treatment as a mentally disordered offender pursuant to Penal Code section 2972. He claimed that the trial court erred by failing to consider whether he was suitable for outpatient treatment, even though he did not raise this alternative in the trial court. The Court of Appeal determines that Rish waived the issue by failing to raise it. As a matter of statutory construction, Section 2972, subdivision (d) does not impose a duty on the court to evaluate suitability for outpatient treatment sua sponte. The court reached the…
- Appellate Procedure, Attorney Fees, California Procedure, Post-Trial Practice, Standard of Review, Statutory Construction
Review of “Private Attorney General” Fee Awards
Kimberly Kralowec at The Appellate Practitioner points out a case from earlier this month, Roybal v. Governing Board of the Salinas City Elementary School District, case no. H030596 (Jan. 11, 2008, ordered published Feb. 6, 2008), in which the Court of Appeal neatly summarizes the proper standards of review to apply when reviewing attorney fee awards made pursuant to California’s “private attorney general” statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The case recognizes the Supreme Court’s 2006 departure from the one-size-fits-all “abuse of discretion” standard in recognition that some awards may be due more deferential review in light of their fact-intensive nature, while those revolving around legal issues like statutory…
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State Law in a Federal Court
In Ryman v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., case no. 06-35630 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2007), the Ninth Circuit reiterates some very basic rules for a federal court to interpret state law. The district court refused to apply state law precedent to a matter of state law because (1) the precedent was from the state’s intermediate appellate court rather than the state’s highest court, and (2) the intermediate court’s opinion had been criticized by other federal courts. The Ninth reminds us that neither reason justifies ignoring relevant precedent from a state’s intermediate appellate court. In the absence of a relevant decision from the state’s highest court on a matter of state…
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Hearsay Admissibility Conditions Blend Into Each Other
A hearsay statement regarding the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant is admissible if it meets the conditions of Evidence Code section 1370, subdivision (a), which include that the statement was made “at or near the time” of the infliction or threat and that the statement was made under circumstances that would indicate its trustworthiness. In People v. Quitiquit, case no. D050385 (4th Dist. Sept. 12, 2007), the Court of Appeal says that a declarant’s statements that the defendant had caused her neck injury seven weeks earlier were not made “at or near” the time of infliction. Thus, the statements were improperly admitted, and Quitiquit’s conviction for…
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The Dictionary’s Role in Statutory Interpretation
Remember the response you got every time you asked your teacher how to spell a word? “Look it up on the dictionary.” To which we all mumbled under our breath, “How am I supposed to look it up if I don’t know how to spell it?” Well, there may be another question that gets the same answer to “look it up in the dictionary.” That question is, “How do I interpret this statute?” Honest. Check out University of Louisville’s law school Library Director Kurt X. Metzmeier’s paper at SSRN (Social Science Research Network) entitled “You Can Look it Up: The Use of Dictionaries in Interpreting Statutes.” No mumbling, now. Here’s…
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California Court Upholds Deadly Weapon Sentencing Enhancement for Animal Cruelty Conviction
Division Four of the Second District Court of Appeal has just upheld a deadly weapon sentencing enhancement under Penal Code section 12022(b)(1) for a conviction of animal cruelty under Penal Code section 597(a). The court rejected the defendant’s contention that a deadly weapon enhancement could only apply to crimes against humans. Animal cruelty under section 597(a) is a felony, and section 12022(b)(1) only requires that the deadly or dangerous weapon have been used “in the commission of a felony or attempted felony.” In this matter of statutory construction, the court stated that “If we were to follow appellant’s interpretation, we would be required to insert the words ‘against a person’…