Ben Shatz, whom I’ve had the pleasure of meeting and corresponding with from time to time, has co-authored (with JoAnne Sweeny) an article recently published as “The Price of Frivolity: A Longitudinal Study of California Appellate Sanctions” (2007) 28 Whittier L.Rev. 1087.
Here’s how the article describes itself in its introduction:
This article attempts to fill that void [in literature regarding sanctions] by exploring the “5 W’s” — who, what, where, when and why — of California appellate sanctions by analyzing court of appeal sanctions awards from 2002 (the first year unreported cases were included in online search engines) through 2005. More specifically, this article describes which courts award sanctions, how much is awarded (compared to how much was requested), how often courts awarded sanctions upon their own motions, what kind of errors (and how egregious) are necessary for an award, and against whom sanctions are awarded (parties, their attorneys, or both).
I’ve read the entire piece and find this introductory statement understates the depth of the article.
Few readers, I’m sure, will be surprised to learn that the article confirms that solo/small firm lawyers are sanctioned more often than lawyers from larger firms. The article looks at this in a purely statistical sense. Other commentators, of course, have alleged a bias against solos and small firms when it comes to discipline. A good starting point for those who are interested is this post at Carolyn Elefant’s “My Shingle” blog, which includes links and a comment that offers some very plausible, bias-free reasons for the disparity. That post addresses ethics committees, but Carolyn has also blogged on bias in the courts. In this post, she comes to the defense of a “big firm” partner against whom a Florida judge issued an OSC re contempt for saying the judge was a “few french fries short of a happy meal,” and she links to her earlier posts on anti-solo judicial bias.
I was struck by how many of the cited cases were unreported. The Court of Appeal should want to publicize the conduct that leads to sanctions, because this would inform and deter. It could be that sanctions are so rare (awarded in approximately 1 out of every 500 cases during the studied period) that the Court of Appeal finds additional deterrence unnecessary. Whatever the reasons for unpublished sanctions opinions, perhaps more of them will be published under the new rules for publication.
Unfortunately, there is no online version of the article available. If that changes, I’ll let you know.
UPDATE: My more recent thinking (2014) on publication of sanctions opinions is here.