I’ve been able to work only on those projects demanding my immediate attention.  Since my blog can’t be dismissed for failure to post, while my cases can be dismissed for failure to file, my limited hours of coherence each day have been devoted to my cases.

I finally feel like I’m on the mend, and hopefully, I’ll be back up to speed next week.

And don’t let this stop you from sending me new cases!

One essential trait that an appellate lawyer must possess is the ability to think about legal issues from the perspective of judges who serve on appellate courts. Appellate courts are not only responsible for trying to reach the correct result in the cases on appeal, but their rulings often create precedents that will govern other cases that don’t even exist yet. Thus, an appellate lawyer must be cognizant not only of how existing precedent will affect an appellate court’s view of a newly filed appeal, but also about how the precedent created in the course of deciding the new case will affect the future direction of the law.  

Not every appeal has such an issue.  If all appeals did, you wouldn’t see so few decisions published.  But this is a question that must be part of every case evaluation and, if such an issue is present, the question of “what if” must be anticipated and answered before it is asked.

At a recent session, a somewhat mischievous question from the presiding justice brought some grins to those waiting and provided food for thought.

Presiding Justice Arthur Gilbert is well known for his wit, and recently it even came out during the criminal case calendar. Usually, all four justices in the division are on the bench, and Justice Gilbert will announce with each case called which of the four justices are on the three-justice panel for that case. One appellant’s counsel took the podium and asked if Justice Gilbert could repeat which of the three justices were on the panel. After repeating the names, Justice Gilbert asked the attorney how she was going to do anything different now that she knew. It seemed like a mischievous question.

Wanting to know who’s on your panel, though, isn’t all that bizarre a request, especially if you’ve become familiar (or at least think you have) with the idiosyncrasies of each justice. Everyone’s heard experienced (and sometimes not-so-experienced) attorneys offer such sage wisdom as “If you draw Justice Razzamatazz, remember that he’s still bitter that the Supreme Court reversed him in Folder v. Screen, so he’s susceptible to arguments that situations shouldn’t be be governed by Folder.” True or not, attorneys act on such “revelations.” (One of the other Justices even quipped in response to Justice Gilbert’s question that if swing Justice Kennedy were on the panel, he’s the only justice the lawyer would have bothered to address.)

In fact, Justice Gilbert may have inadvertently been on to something. A while back, Tom Caso highlighted a study noting that certain substantive areas of the law draw more opinions from some judges more than others. In the words of the author “opinion specialization [is an] unmistakable part of every day judicial practice.” Tom took note of the practical implications:

If true, this suggests a more focused approach for the federal appellate lawyer. One of the difficulties for the appellate practitioner is not knowing the audience for the brief. If, however, opinions are assigned based on the specialities of the individual judges, the brief can be written with those individual judges in mind. This population of potential opinion writers is still larger than the ultimate panel that will hear the case. Nonetheless, by studying whether a particular subset of judges in your circuit write most of the opinions in your area of the law, you have the opportunity of focusing your presentation to address the concerns of those particular judges.

I think a lot of lawyers put too much stock in what they think they know of a judge’s biases. Most of the time a lawyer expresses a negative opinion about the judge, I find it is due to sour grapes over a loss.

However, a judge’s legal approach to things is certainly a fair factor to take into account. For instance, it’s probably not wise to rely on the aforementioned “Justice Razzamatazz’s” purported “bitterness,” but it strikes me as practical to look at his reasoning in the Folder case to see if you can craft an argument that is more likely to persuade him.

Tri Counties asserted that the the judge should be disqualified for conducting an independent investigation into a factual issue relevant to class certification.  It learned of the investigation from the trial court’s tentative ruling in the class certification motion and, in a supplemental memorandum, urged it as a ground to deny certification.  When the trial court certified the class, Tri Counties sought appellate review of the certification order by petitioning for a writ of mandate, citing the improper investigation as a ground to grant the petition, but did not seek the trial judge’s disualification.  Only after that petition was denied did Tri Counties submit its 170.3 statement of objection, which the trial court struck as untimely.  Tri Counties then filed a writ petition challenging that order.

Tri Counties contended that the stay issued in connection with the first writ petition prevented it from filing its statement of objection until the conclusion of that proceeding.  The court notes, however, that the stay did not take effect until more than three moths after Tri Counties became aware of the improper investigation, leaving it plenty of time to challenge the judge.

The second reason the court gave was more interesting.  It holds that proceedings regarding the qualification of a judge are distinct from the ordinary proceedings, and the stay affects only the latter:

Second, although unnecessary to our conclusion that the statement of objection was untimely, it is our view that petitioner could have filed a statement of objection even while the stay was in effect.  Our general stay of proceedings was obviously directed to the underlying proceedings between the parties to the action (i.e., to the litigation itself), not to questions of the judge’s qualification to preside over those proceedings.  A judge’s qualification to preside as judge in a particular case is foundational to, and hence distinct from, the ordinary proceedings between the parties that would be tried or heard by the judge.  (See § 170.5, subd. (f).)  Because of this basic distinction between a judge’s qualification and the underlying litigation, we do not believe that our stay could reasonably be understood as barring petitioner from promptly filing a statement of objection in the trial court.  We note further that disqualification of the trial judge was not raised in the writ of mandate petition challenging the class certification order, thus the filing of a statement of objection to pursue disqualification would not have interfered with or affected our appellate review of that order.

This is an interesting and important distinction.  It’s also quite interesting that the court went out of its way to discuss it, since it was unnecessary once it found Tri Counties had delayed too long even before the stay went into effect.

Modern communication and the California Rules of Court collide in Citizens for Civic Accountability v. Town of Danville, case no. A121899 (1st Dist. Oct. 27, 2008), and the winner is . . . the rules! At issue: whether the e-mailing of a notice that a judgment has been filed, with a link to access a copy of the judgment, triggers the deadline to appeal under rule 8.104(a), California Rules of Court, which provides that a 60-day deadline to appeal is triggered when the clerk “mails” a notice of entry of judgment or a file-stamped copy of the judgment.

The trial court designated the case complex litigation and ordered compliance with the court’s Electronic Case Filing Standing Order, which provided that orders filed by the court would be served electronically only, either by e-mail or through an electronic filing service provider (in this case, LexisNexis File & Serve). The order granting in part and denying in part the petition for writ of mandate was served as follows:

On April 1, 2008, LexisNexis File & Serve sent the parties a message by electronic transmission (an e-mail) stating, “You are being served documents that have been electronically submitted in [Citizens for Public Accountability v. Town of Danville] through LexisNexis File & Serve.” The e-mail identified the document as a Judgment on Petition for Writ of Mandate, and stated that it had been authorized for filing on April 1, 2008. To view the document, the parties had to visit a LexisNexis File & Serve website, sign in, and open a document file. The document so accessed bore an “electronically filed” file stamp dated April 1, 2008.

Respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed more than 60 days after that electronic service. The court of appeal denies he motion, holding that “the 60-day appeal period in California Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) is triggered only by the mailing of a judgment by the United States Postal Service.” (Emphasis added.) Keys to this conclusion: resolution of ambiguities in the rules should be construed to preserve the right to appeal, statutory distinctions between mailing and other forms of service indicate that “mail” means the U.S. Postal Service.

Mixed bags create competing incentives. Here, one incentive got the best of Satchmed.

UWMC complied with the judgment by offering the 22 offices to Satchmed, which decided to purchase them. But those other 12 units. . . well, Satchmed just couldn’t let go. And those guys at Satchmed must have thought, “Hey, if you think about it, we won on 22 of 34 units, so aren’t we the prevailing party?” So Satchmed appealed, challenging those portions of the judgment regarding the 12 units and the prevailing party determination.

Under the established doctrine that a party’s voluntary acceptance of the benefits of a judgment — or even a portion of them — precludes an appeal by that party, Satchmed’s appeal is dismissed on the ground that it waived its right to appeal by purchasing the 22 units. Satchmed claimed the doctrine did not apply because of two equally established equitable exceptions. The court not only rejected the arguments, but noted that Satchmed’s conduct was manipulative.

First, Satchmed claimed that its acceptance of the benefits was compelled, rather than voluntary, because it risked losing its right to purchase the 22 units if it appealed the judgment. After noting that Satchmed could have appealed “without fear that its right to accept UWMC’s offer would evaporate by the simple act of filing” because matters relating to enforcement of the judgment would have been automatically stayed by the appeal, the court points out the lack of any real compulsion:

The judgment did not put Satchmed at risk of losing any property it already owned. Furthermore, Satchmed was not at risk of forfeiting monies to which it was entitled by statute if it chose to prosecute an appeal. Satchmed just wanted to aggrandize its award without risk. It simply had to choose whether it wanted to file an appeal in pursuit of an even greater award than the judgment provided to it, which would entail risking a reversal of the favorable portion of the judgment, or whether it wanted to simply accept the benefit of the favorable portion of the judgment, and thereby waive the right to appeal from the unfavorable portions. Having to make a choice of this nature does not make the chosen avenue involuntary.

Second, Satchmed contended the judgment was severable, but the court find that the only facts that Satchmed relied on were created by it after the judgment, and points out that a party may not make a nonseverable judgment severable by its post-judgment actions:

[T]he portions of the judgment pertaining to the 12 leased units and the prevailing party status are not severable. Satchmed attempts to use clever timing to convert a nonseverable judgment into a severable one. We look here at the judgment at the time it was entered, before any party appealed therefrom. At that point in time, it is clear that the judgment was not severable. A ruling pertaining to the 12 leased units easily could have affected the 22 owned units, and vice versa. But Satchmed seized the portion of the judgment beneficial to itself, and took title to the 22 owned units. It then said that no ruling on the 12 leased units could possibly affect the status of the 22 owned units. In other words, it had then put the 22 owned units beyond the reach of UWMC’s attack and beyond the purview of this court. Satchmed’s claim that the judgment was then severable is essentially a claim that the judgment had become severable because Satchmed had made it so. It does not work that way. Satchmed cannot have its cake and eat it too. Having accepted the benefits of the portion of the judgment making title to the 22 owned units available to it, it cannot now attack the portion of the judgment making title to the 12 leased units unavailable to it.

In short: a judgment is either severable when entered or not. One cannot convert a severable judgment into a severable one.

Are you tempted by the juicy part of a judgment, but tempted to appeal the rest? Think it over carefully before you decide what to do, and especially think twice about maneuvering to make the facts fit within an exception to the “acceptance equals waiver” rule. It won’t pay off.

Well, a young blog, at least, if not brand spanking new. The California Constitution was launched in August by Howard Rice partner Steve Mayer. Good luck!

Hat tip: California Punitive Damages.

Today’s post looks at another ability-related reason the trial lawyer decides to handle the appeal. He — and in this case, I’m referring to a trial lawyer that specializes in some substantive area of the law — thinks to himself:

“This case needs a specialist.”

The trial lawyer who says that rarely means an appellate specialist. Instead, the ace employment lawyer (to use just one example) thinks, “This employment case needs an employment lawyer like me on appeal, I can’t pass it off to an appellate lawyer.” Let’s take a look at that assumption.

Does the Case Require a Specialist?

First, let me make clear that I use the term “specialist” throughout this post in the generic sense. That is, I use it not to refer to someone who is certified as a specialist by her state bar, but to refer to someone who devotes most of their practice to a certain area of the law.*

Let’s assume you’ve got a construction case handled by a construction law litigator, and now it’s time for the appeal. The lawyer who fits the type I’m describing thinks that he’s too indispensable to the appeal to hand it off to an appellate lawyer.

He may be right. (Another thing you may not have expected me to write in this series.) He may be almost indispensable in a particular case. But does that mean he should handle the appeal himself?

Probably not. Specialized knowledge of the substantive law can certainly have its advantages on appeal. That’s why a smart appellate lawyer consults with the trial attorney in any case. But specialization can breed the same sort of tunnel vision as that bred by an intimate familiarity with the case: namely, an inability to let go of (or even recognize) weak arguments, a failure to recognize good ones, and keeping too many arguments. (See Part 3 of this series for more on those problems.)

How could a specialist confuse good arguments with bad ones? Because he fails to appreciate the differences between trial practice and appellate review. Great trial arguments based on your version of the facts won’t be worth much (if anything) if the jury didn’t ultimately agree with your version of the facts. Those arguments may have seemed awfully compelling presented to a jury, and the trouble is that the trial lawyer (and especially his client) may be so aghast at the jury’s refusal to agree with his set of facts that he refuses to let the argument go on appeal.

The Client Perspective

Clients hunger for specialists. (If you don’t believe me, believe this guy.) The sad part is, the typical client’s hunger for a specialist will usually lead the client to assume that the specialist he hired for his case in employment law, school law, personal injury law, construction law — you get the picture — is the right attorney to take that case all the way to the United States Supreme Court.

It’s also possible that the client regards a long-time attorney client relationship with his law firm as a second, and equally important, form of specialization. A client that has had all its legal work, from regulatory compliance to the occasional (or not so occasional) lawsuit, handled by the same lawyer or firm for the last decade or more may view the trial lawyer (and the trial firm) as “specialists” in the client’s needs, regardless of the substantive area of the law at issue. An individual client whose solo lawyer has likewise addressed his needs over the years — wrote his will, handled his divorce, represented him in that drunk driving case, for example — may have the same mindset.

The “Last of the Generalists”

Both lawyers and their clients who are enthralled by the idea of having a specialist handle the appeal may tend to think in terms of the wrong specialties. It is not specialization in the client or in the substantive area of the law that usually matters most. It is the knowledge of appellate practice that can make the difference on appeal.

What does the client (and his or its lawyer) really need to consider? I think the answer, or at least a good chunk of it, was well expressed several months ago by D. Todd Smith of the Texas Appellate Law Blog. Writing on the related issue of whether in-house counsel should stick with big firms for their appeals, Todd wrote:

Appellate lawyers are perhaps the last of the generalists. Although appellate practice has gained notoriety as a specialty, it focuses less on the substantive law than on the lawyer’s research and writing ability, knowledge of appellate procedure, and familiarity with the court hearing the case. Because appeals are limited to the trial record, knowledge of the client’s business and history are not as important as the ability to guide the client through the appellate process with the goal for that specific case in mind.

I love that expression: “the last of the generalists.” Though it is not, of course, true in a technical sense — especially in smaller towns — I think it captures where appellate lawyers fit into a legal world increasingly dominated by specialists in various substantive areas of the law. Whether a client’s case was handled by a specialist in dog bites, toxic torts, automobile accidents, tax, employment, malpractice, wills and estates, business litigation, or any of the myriad of other specialties, the appellate lawyer is ready to tackle it.

Try Working Together

For those lawyers and clients who just can’t bear to “hand the case off” to a new lawyer for the appeal, there is always the option of working with the appellate lawyer. Shared work arrangements can be customized to a given case. Increased expenses to the client may be surprisingly nominal, since the typical appellate lawyer usually confers to some degree with the trial lawyer in any event.

* NOTE: I provide the above definition of “specialist” because my own jurisdiction is quite picky about the term. The last I checked, a California lawyer may not refer to himself as a “specialist” unless he has been certified as a specialist by the state bar. That rule applies, at least, to areas in which the bar certifies specialists; I’m not sure whether it applies if the bar does not offer certification in one’s “specialty.” Hence, my generic use of the term in this post.

The last of these variables is what helps the appellant overcome this highly deferential standard of review and have the default judgment against it lifted in Fasuyi v. Permatetex, Inc. case no. A117760 (1st Dist. Oct. 15, 2008).  Permatex made a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 to vacate the default judgment against it and appealed from the order denying relief.  The court of appeal tells us at the outset that the “abuse of discretion” standard applicable here may not be quite as deferential as you would expect (footnote omitted): 

The law favors resolution of cases on their merits, and because it does, any doubts about whether Code of Civil Procedure section 473 relief should be granted “must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial court denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an order permitting trial on the merits. [Citations.]” (Rappleyea v. Campbell(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 (Rappleyea).) Justice Mosk began Rappleyea with a succinct statement of the question before the Supreme Court and its answer: “The question is whether a default must be set aside and a default judgment reversed on the ground of abuse of discretion. We conclude that they must be.” (8 Cal.4th at p. 978.) The question before us is the same. And so is our answer.

There are two dichotomies here, one clearly defined, one not.  Orders denying 473 relief will be “scrutinized more carefully” than orders granting relief.  That is clear-cut.  What isn’t so clear is what “scrutinized more carefully” actually means while remaining within the “abuse of discretion” standard.” 

In any event, the case is yet another reminder that “abuse of discretion” may have a particularized meaning or application in your case.  And if you happen to be requesting a default judgment any time soon, I suggest you read this case for some of the pitfalls and an exposition on the gatekeeping role of the trial court.

“Envision an appeal as the freeway between Fresno and Los Angeles, with Fresno being the filing of the notice of appeal and Los Angeles being a decision on the merits,” he said. “Now, think of each exit on that stretch of freeway as an opportunity for the court not to reach the merits. The court would prefer to take one of those exits rather than reach Los Angeles, there are an awful lot of exits, and it’s going to check each one as it goes by to see if the exit provides an opportunity to get off the freeway presents.”  Hence, his nickname for issues that can prevent a decision on the merits: “freeway issues.”

Are there freeway issues lurking in your appeal?  Be ready to address them!   Because a smart respondent’s lawyer is going to look for them.  (I will go through some of the freeway issues in a future post.)

Today’s post looks at another ability-related reason the trial lawyer decides to handle the appeal.  He thinks to himself:

“No one knows the case better than I do.”

Who could argue with that?  The trial lawyer may have spent hundreds or thousands of hours on the case over several years.  Met every witness personally and attended every deposition.  Pored through every discovery response, every document, every exhibit and every transcript.  Several times.

And yet . . . I still think it unwise, in most circumstances, for the trial lawyer to handle the appeal.  In fact, I think reliance on one’s own familiarity with the case is a particularly dangerous reason to remain counsel on appeal.  Because when the trial lawyer says, “No one knows the case better than I do,” what he’s really saying, usually without knowing it, is:

“No one knows the case from my perspective better than I do.”

A trial lawyer’s failure to include the emphasized language in his thought process indicates he’s not looking at the case objectively.  This is dangerous for at least three reasons.

First, the trial attorney (or client) may be unwilling to let go of bad arguments. Lawyers, but especially clients, can become so wrapped up in a bad argument because it has been the centerpiece of their case for years (indeed, this can often sink prospects on appeal).  Sometime, emotional attachment to the argument derives from its very nature, such as a claim of fraud or inequitable conduct against a party despised by the other.  Being out to “get” someone is a terrible reason to take your case up on appeal.  And bad arguments may even be frivolous ones, subjecting you to (admittedly rare) sanctions for a frivolous appeal.

Second, the resulting corollary: the trial lawyer misses the good arguments.  Especially easy to miss are new arguments that might be raised notwithstanding the general rule that new arguments cannot be raised on appeal.

Third, the trial lawyer keeps too many arguments.  Raising 47 points of error is not usually a successful strategy.  If the KISS principle (Keep It Simple, Stupid) didn’t already exist, it would have been coined for appeals.  Of course some cases are complicated by nature, making simplification on appeal challenging, so not every case can be reduced to “simple.” But it should be reduced to the simplest possible presentation.

A fresh, objective look at the case will allow appellate counsel to clear out the deadwood and focus the appeal on the best arguments. This is because the appellate lawyer’s perspective is — initially, at least — not much different than that of the appellate court itself.  That view of the case is uncluttered by knowledge of written discovery or deposition testimony that never made it into the record (though of course, the appellate lawyer should look at excluded evidence to see if exclusion was prejudicial), or biases for or against witnesses, parties, or the judge.

Does this fresh look at the case really have to be undertaken by an appellate lawyer?  As one reader pointed out: “I think the best argument for a specialized appellate lawyer is that he or she takes a fresh look at the case and issues, but that is hardly the exclusive domain of appellate specialists.”  The suggestion is that the trial attorney can readily handle the appeal as long as he has another attorney, appellate practitioner or not, look at the case.

I think it is important that the lawyer taking the fresh look at the case be an appellate lawyer.  First, if the analysis by the appellate lawyer convinces the trial lawyer that it is best to pass the case to an appellate lawyer for the appeal, then part of the appellate work — the initial review — is already done.  But even where the trial lawyer is virtually certain he will handle the appeal himself, review by an appellate lawyer is best because the appellate lawyer will look at the case through an appellate lens, giving the trial lawyer insights he may not have gained from another trial lawyer.

Bottom line: even where a trial attorney intends to handle the appeal himself, a case going up on appeal needs a fresh look.  That can be by the original trial attorney, a trial attorney colleague, or appellate counsel.  But the trial attorney is usually best served by having it done by appellate counsel.

Such is the case with White v. Mayflower Transit, case no. 07-55528 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2008), in which the court writes that the pro se appellant contended that the district court lacked removal jurisdiction over the case.  But they don’t explain the substance of the appellant’s argument.  They merely explain how the facts of the case demonstrate the applicability of a federal statute that grants exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts.  Pretty cut-and-dried.

Why not say what the appellant’s argument was?  Given the fact he was pro se and the short, plain way in which the court establishes the existence of removal jurisdiction, I get the sense that we were robbed of a very interesting read.  Shouldn’t the court at least mention what the argument was, even if just to dismiss it as ridiculous and thereby reduce the chance that it is raised by a subsequent litigant?

I got curious enough that I looked up the case on Westlaw.  The appellant’s brief wasn’t available, but the appellee’s brief was, and according to appellee, the appellant’s arguments were “difficult to decipher.”  Thus the appellee, like the court, skipped right over the substance of appellant’s argument and presented an affirmative case for jurisdiction without trying to refute whatever it was appellant was trying to say.

In the district court, Vega challenged two conditions on the supervised release portion of his sentence.  On appeal, however, he argued that a third condition of his supervised release was also error.

You might think he’d be out of luck entirely on that third condition, the general rule being that an argument cannot be made for the first time on appeal  But he’s not.

Though Vega did not challenge the third condition in the district court, the effect of that failure is not to foreclose his argument in the court of appeals, but merely to subject his claim to a standard of review more difficult for him to overcome.  That is, for the two conditions Vega did challenge in the district court, the court of appeals evaluates the district court’s imposition of the conditions under an abuse of discretion standard, while requiring “plain error” for the condition left unchallenged in the district court.

There’s a larger lesson here.  Notwithstanding the general rule that arguments raised for the first time on appeal will not be entertained by the appellate court, I think it pays for an appellant to be aggressive about raising such arguments — good ones, at least — wherever the rules suggest a way to get them in.  Don’t dismiss arguments out of hand just because they were not raised (or perhaps raised with less specificity) in the trial court.  Carefully look at the case law, and if there’s an argument to be made that the court should consider your “new” argument, go for it.

Critical to our review of any summary judgment is the moving party’s separate statement of undisputed facts. Gunn elected to proceed by way of an appellant’s appendix (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124), in which he has included Mariners Church’s points and authorities and its attorney’s declaration to which various deposition pages and other pieces of documentary evidence, but not Mariners Church’s actual separate statement of undisputed facts. Gunn’s failure to provide a complete record arguably precludes him from meeting his appellate burden. [Citations.]

Gunn has, however, included his own separate statement in the appellant’s appendix, which appears to be in the form required by the court rules juxtaposing Mariners Church’s assertions of undisputed fact with Gunn’s responses thereto. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d).) And Mariners Church does not suggest Gunn’s separate statement inaccurately represents its statement of undisputed facts. Accordingly, we will proceed on the merits based on Gunn’s separate statement and the evidence Mariners Church submitted.

I wonder how much of the court’s forgiveness was due to the fact that it affirmed anyway. I suspect most panels would be quite reluctant to reverse on a similar record.

The bottom line: don’t rely on the court’s largesse. Include a thorough record.

Such were the lawyers representing the appellants in Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, case no. 07-35315 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2008).  Lazy Y sued, alleging a violation of equal protection, after its bids for grazing on state land were rejected in favor of other bidders.  The defendants moved to dismiss under Feceral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, arguing that the complaint failed to allege a violation of equal protection and, alternatively, that the defendants had qualified immunity.  Their motion to dismiss relied on extrinsic documents.  Lazy Y moved successfully to strike many of those documents, and prevailed against the motion to dismiss.  Defendants appealed from both the order denying the motion to dismiss and the order striking certain exhibits.

Taking up the question of jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine, the court reasons:

We begin by briefly addressing Lazy Y’s suggestion that we lack appellate jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal.  Lazy Y argues that (1) Defendants’ attacks on the order denying the motion to dismiss exceed the scope of the “collateral order” doctrine upon which they allege jurisdiction, and (2) the order granting Lazy Y’s motion to strike documents is unappealable under any doctrine. We disagree.

In general, a party is entitled only to a single appeal, to be “deferred until final judgment has been entered.” [Citation.] However, under the collateral order doctrine, a litigant may appeal from a “narrow class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation, but must, in the interest of achieving a healthy legal system, nonetheless be treated as final.” [Citation.] To be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, a district court decision must (1) be “conclusive,” (2) “resolve important questions completely separate from the merits,” and (3) “render such important questions effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action.” [Citation.]

Because qualified immunity is immunity from suit itself and not merely a defense to liability, orders denying qualified immunity may be immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, including orders denying a motion to dismiss. [Citation.] Such an order is reviewable to the extent that it raises an issue of law. [Citations.]

Here, contrary to Lazy Y’s suggestion, we do not construe Defendants’ appeal to depend on “their version of the facts.” Rather, Defendants argue that Lazy Y’s allegations of pretext and animus are irrelevant under Equal Protection law, because they have articulated legitimate reasons for rejecting Lazy Y’s bids. In other words, Defendants argue that their articulated purposes end the inquiry and mean that Lazy Y’s claims of actual improper motives fail to establish an Equal Protection violation. They also argue that Lazy Y brings “class of one” claims that are either incognizable or not clearly established in the context of public contracting. These are contentions of law. [Citation.]

Moreover, whether Defendants’ exhibits should have been considered is essentially a legal question, and the order granting the motion to strike was simply part of the Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, as the district court resolved that motion solely to establish the record for the motion to dismiss. [Citation.]

So, appellants got their day in the court of appeals.  Turns out to be for naught, however, as the court affirms.  But at least they had their shot.

In my first post in this series, I broke down lawyers’ reasons for not engaging appellate counsel into two broad categories: those related to ability and those related to economics. Today, we will examine a reason related to ability:

“It’s just litigation”, or “Hey, I’m a litigator, and appeals are litigation, so I can do it.“

Are appeals litigation?  Well, let’s see.  Adverse parties?  Check.  Legal and/or factual disputes?  Check.  Courtroom and judges?  Check.  Judgments?  Check.  Yeah, I’d say that appeals are litigation.

That said, they are a continuation of litigation, and with crossing the boundary from trial court to court of appeal, the parties and their attorneys enter a new realm.  That realm has multiple judges hearing the same case, no juries, no discovery, few motions, and an emphasis on persuasive writing that is rivaled in the trial court only on dispositive motions.

As I  noted in my first post, many lawyers are comfortable, and  quite able, on both sides of the divide.  Neither this post nor any other in the series is meant to deride the skills of trial lawyers.

But there are pitfalls that await the lawyer who assumes appellate practice is no different than trial practice.  Perhaps the biggest is the standard of review.

Pitfalls in the Standard of Review.

The trial lawyer entering the appellate landscape for the first time may have difficulty navigating through it.  That can result in wasting time (and, for the client, hourly fees) on useless activities or argument, even a failure to even recognize the burden he or she faces on appeal.

One such useless exercise in the court of appeal that happens with shocking regularity is to argue to the court as if the three justices are a jury: this witness is believable, this one is not; that evidence should be disregarded; the other side’s story makes no sense, etc.  How do I know this happens?  I’ve talked to a couple of appellate justices — not a large enough sample to be of statistical significance, admittedly — who told me this happens regularly. Not necessarily frequently, but regularly.

This approach betrays the lawyer’s lack of familiarity with the most fundamental brick in the appellate arsenal: the standard of review.  Which is why I was so stunned by the justices’ revelations, even though I have seen appellant’s briefs that didn’t even mention the standard of review.  (Occasionally, you might even see a court neglect to state it!)

Simply put, an appeal isn’t your second chance to try the case.  It’s merely an opportunity to convince the court of appeal that the trial court erred and that the error prejudiced your client.

Of course, the evidence in the trial court can come into play in the court of appeal, just in a different way (usually).  But even in cases of substantial evidence review — in which the court of appeal will reverse if there is no substantial evidence to support a finding required by the judgment — persuasion based on credibility is generally out of place.

What’s more, unfamiliarity with the standards of review on appeal might cause a lawyer to miss good arguments entirely.  An undue concentration on the evidence produced at trial may lead the trial attorney to miss important issues preserved for appeal on a less deferential standard of review, and thus presenting a greater chance of success on appeal.  Is there a legal issue you’ve missed because you are so wound up in the presentation of evidence at trial?  If so, you’ve missed an opportunity to obtain “de novo” review, under which the court gives no deference to the trial court — your best shot at success.  In fact, that legal issue may be hidden within a more deferential standard — whether the trial court abused its discretion, or whether substantial evidence supports the judgment, may in turn rely on a question of law subject to de novo review.

Simply put, the simplicity of the standard of review structure — de novo review, abuse of discretion, and substantial evidence — masks a lot of nuance not readily discernible to someone unfamiliar with appellate practice.  It’s far more than a “smell test”.  Indeed, parties regularly argue over the applicable standard, either because the nature of the issue is misleading or because the applicable standard for a given judgment has not been established (such as here, here, or here, for example).  If it were really simple all the time, would there be a book on the subject?

I haven’t discussed some other pitfalls, mostly for the sake of brevity (if you can call this post brief).  Perhaps I will give this particular reason for not engaging appellate counsel — “it’s just litigation” — a few more posts of its own.

Preferences.

Finally, the trial lawyer may find that he or she simply does not like the appellate process.  As I noted in my first post:

Some trial lawyers just plain don’t like doing appeals.  For some, it may be because appeals lack everything they like about litigation: frequent confrontation, lots of court appearances, sleuthing through discovery, and lots of twists and turns.  Appellate practice usually isn’t a hotbed of excitement.

If your strengths lie in frequent confrontation, then maybe apeals aren’t for you, either as a matter of preference or a matter of skill set.  (This is especially true if you don’t like spending time in the law library or writing, but I’ll address that preference in a future post.)

The Client’s Perspective.

The client consideration that parallels the lawyer’s belief that “it’s just litigation” is really an absence of consideration.  That is, many clients may see no difference at all between their trial court action and the appeal.  The client is only likely to note the differences if the lawyer points them out.  And if the lawyer doesn’t see them, the lawyer cannot point them out.  Under these circumstances, the only time many clients are likely to seek an appellate attorney is if the client is genuinely displeased with the trial lawyer’s services.

However, I think this situation is changing over time.  I suspect that clients, like all consumers, are becoming more and more knowledgeable all the time about the services they receive.  The inquiries I receive from lay readers of my blog tell me that clients are learning that there is a difference between trial work and appellate work.

Clients almost always want a specialist when one is available.  An employment discrimination plaintiff doesn’t seek a personal injury lawyer when a plaintiff’s employment lawyer is available.  Over time, I expect more and more clients will seek new representation on appeal, and won’t need their trial lawyers to put them on notice of the differences between trial and appellate work.  They will challenge their trial lawyers’ unspoken assumption that the trial lawyer is always the right person to handle the appeal.

(NOTE: To access all posts in this series to date, click here.  Finally, allow me to again solicit your participation.  If you’d like to offer a topic for a post in this series, leave your comment in this post or, preferably, in the post announcing this series.  And don’t hesitate to repeat a topic someone has already left.  That will tell me there is greater interest in that topic.)

Client parallel: unawareness of appellate specialization

Please let me know if you’re interested in a legal bloggers meeting at the state bar convention in monterey this week. 

We could have drinks at the Hyatt between, say, 5 and 7 on the 27th — the annual dinner & cabaret starts at 7 p.m. that evening — Saturday — and we could just flow into that event; or we could do Thursday AT the Opening Night reception, which starts at 5:45 . . . I’ve got the Cal Women Lawyers Annual Dinner at 7 p.m. 

What would be most convenient for everyone? 

Reply to Vickie Pynchon at vpynchon@settlenow.com or leave a comment on the [LinkedIn] Group discussion thread on the meetup. Thanks.

I realized why appellate lawyers at law firms are stereotypically labeled as the smartest lawyers at the firm. The fact that they can come to work, day in and day out, and spend hours thinking and writing at such a level makes them nothing less than brilliant, if you ask me.

I can’t figure out why, but that was my favorite part.

Actually, I think it’s a case of comparing apples to oranges.  I spent more than a decade litigating in trial courts, so I have a feel for both sides of the coin, and I think that whatever you like to do tends to be less mentally taxing than other things.

For example, one of the most mentally exhausting activities, in my experience, is listening to deposition or trial testimony.  Maybe that makes me odd, but trying to listen intently to every word, for hours on end, to make sure that a potentially significant disclosure doesn’t slip by used to leave me absolutely drained at the end of the day.

Image via Wikipedia

By contrast, I can spend 12 straight hours in the library and emerge fresh as a daisy.  In a networking group I’m currently checking out, I jokingly tell people that on appeal, they want an egghead like me precisely because eggheads like me like spending all our time reading and writing.  And, as I point out here, some trial attorneys find appellate work just plain boring.

To each his own.

Hat tip: Texas Appellate Law Blog.

Well, it’s been four weeks since I promised a series of posts on this topic.  You were probably about to give up on me.

I started the first post, and it kept growing, and growing, and growing . . . clearly, some better way of organizing the topics was necessary.  And I’ve devoted substantial time to it.

How did I get to this point?  I started writing about what I figure is the number one reason lawyers don’t engage appellate counsel.  The trial lawyer thinks to himself:

“I can do it myself.”

Is that the top reason trial lawyers decide not to engage appellate counsel? I don’t know, but it certainly is a major one.  I think it is quite likely the number one reason, for it arises from, and indeed encompasses, many subsidiary reasons.

Which brings me back to the categorization of reasons lawyers and clients are reluctant to engage appellate counsel.  I think lawyers’ reeasons can be broken down into two main groups:

1. Ability reasons (the “I can do it myself” mindset).
2. Economic reasons.

I may come up with other categories as I write these posts, but for now, those are the two “biggies.”  Here are the reasons I have thus far identified in each category.

Ability Reasons.

Here are some of the thoughts that go through a trial lawyer’s head when deciding not to engage appellate counsel:

1. “Hey, I’m a litigator, and appeals are litigation, so I can do it.”
2. “No one knows this case better than I do.”
3. “This case requires a specialist in the law of  [the substantive field of the case, e.g. employment, civil rights, torts, etc.].”
4. “I can research and write as well as the next guy.”

Subsequent posts will take a closer look at these subsidiary concerns leading to the “I can do it myself” mindset.   For now, let’s take a look at that statement at a macro level.

Can a trial lawyer handle the appeal of his own case, or fight the appeal by the other party? Of course. Some of them, quite ably.

Weren’t expecting that, were you? But how can anyone deny that there are lawyers who quite capably handle a case at both the trial and appellate level? I know some and have worked with some in the past. They’re not mythical creatures.  In fact, one commenter, in response to my post soliciting ideas, wrote that extensive trial court experience is an asset: “My personal belief is that appeals to the intermediate courts are best handled by lawyers well versed in both appeals and trial court proceedings. Probably not what the audience of [The California Blog of Appeal] wants to hear.”

Well, I don’t know about my audience, but I don’t mind hearing that at all.  In fact, I tend to agree, and I suspect that this describes many full-time appellate practitioners.  I can’t be the only guy who got into this gig after a dozen years of trial court litigation.

But not everyone is up to it.  Some trial lawyers just plain don’t like doing appeals.  For some, it may be because appeals lack everything they like about litigation: frequent confrontation, lots of court appearances, sleuthing through discovery, and lots of twists and turns.  Appellate practice usually isn’t a hotbed of excitement.

There are other trial lawyers who avoid appeals because they know appeals do not play to their strengths, or they don’t feel they know enough about them.

Then there are those who think, “I can do it myself,” and either shouldn’t or can’t.

Economic Reasons.

Any trial lawyer may be somewhat nervous to recommend that a client engage another lawyer for the appeal.  Some thoughts that can run through the trial lawyer’s mind:

1. “I’m handling the case for a contingency fee, and an appellate lawyer won’t do that.”
2. “I’m rather slow right now.  I could use the fee generated by the appeal.”
3. “This is a good client.  What if the appellate lawyers takes him away permanently?”
4. “I think I might have screwed this case up.  What if the appellate lawyer tells the client?”

Again, I’ll go through these individually in subsequent posts. At a macro level, though, it’s worth noting that economic concerns are legitimate.  But a lawyer has to be careful not to let his own interests trump those of the client.

Clients’ Reasons.

Sometimes, the decision not to engage an appellate attorney is no doubt driven by the client, and may even be against the advice of the trial lawyer.  Reasons include:

1. “I can’t afford an appeal.”
2. “An appellate lawyer will just try to talk me out of making the argument I want to make.”
3. “Why should I pay a second lawyer?”
4. “The case is hopeless.  Why even try?”
5. “My lawyer won at trial.  Who better to fight my opponent’s appeal?”
6. “Even if I win the right to a retrial, that trial judge will just find some other way to screw me.”

Some of these are no more than parallels to the attorney’s reasons.  I will probably discuss those in the posts about the parallel attorney reasons.

One factor, however, tends to underlay all of these: the client has no idea how different an appeal is from the trial court proceedings.  The client may think he actually gets to retry the case in the court of appeal.

Future Posts.

Keep in mind that I developed most of these reasons by asking myself why I wouldn’t engage appellate counsel if I were a trial lawyer (or a client).  And I’m not sure I’ll be able to write posts about discrete reasons without overlap with other reasons.  Some overlap is unavoidable.  But I will try to stick to a single reason as the focus of each post.

Finally, allow me to again solicit your participation.  If you’d like to offer a topic for a post in this series, leave your comment in this post or, preferably, in the post announcing this series.  And don’t hesitate to repeat a topic someone has already left.  That will tell me there is greater interest in that topic.

(NOTE: To access all posts in this series to date, click here.)

Maybe you didn’t know that this disqualification procedure is available even after reversal on appeal.  Subdivision (a)(2) of section 170.6 provides

A motion under this paragraph may be made following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s decision, or following reversal on appeal of a trial court’s final judgment, if the trial judge in the prior proceeding is assigned to conduct a new trial on the matter.  Notwithstanding paragraph (3), the party who filed the appeal that resulted in the reversal of a final judgment of a trial court may make a motion under this section regardless of whether that party or side has previously done so.  The motion shall be made within 60 days after the party or the party’s attorney has been notified of the assignment.

Since appellants frequently feel they were treated unfairly by the trial judge in the first instance, the ability to “paper the judge” after a reversal on appeal is a critically important consideration.  It may be the one thing that convinces an aggrieved party to appeal, when that party might otherwise have been resigned to accept an adverse judgment because the prospect of having to retry the case before the same judge the party thinks is an idiot is simply too daunting.

But you’ve got to be careful about when you count on it and when you don’t, as the real parties in interest learned in C.C. v. Superior Court, case no. G040580 (4th Dist. Sept. 11, 2008), a juvenile dependency proceeding in which, after succeeding on appeal by obtaining a reversal of a reunification order, real parties “papered the judge.”  Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandate, and the court of appeal grants the petition.

The language allowing a peremptory challenge on remand was added in 1985 to avoid perceived bias against an appellant of a trial judge whose judgment or order had been reversed on appeal.  (Stegs Investments v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 572, 575-576.)  But the statute applies only where the remand requires “a ‘reexamination’ of a factual or legal issue that was in controversy in the prior proceeding.”  (Geddes v. Superior Court (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 417, 424.)  It does not apply to the performance of a ministerial act.  (Stegs Investments v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.)

The problem for real parties, however, is that the remand order required the trial court to perform only ministerial acts.  Those were: (1) to enter a new order denying reunification services and (2) setting a permanent plan selection hearing.  The court rejected the real parties’ argument that the subsequent hearing would require a reexamination of the same issues considered in the reunification hearing.

The real parties in interest claim, “the juvenile court in the present case will undoubtedly revisit the core determinations upon which this Court based its reversal,” meaning it will have to consider the strength of the bond between the children and the mother at the permanent plan selection hearing.  This claim is true, but the consideration of the parent-child bond at the permanent plan selection hearing is not for purposes of reunification; rather, it is to determine whether to avoid the termination of parental rights and select a different permanent plan.  (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)  This consideration will take place in a different legal context from the disposition hearing and will involve facts as they then exist.  On remand, however, the juvenile court was merely directed to enter an order denying reunification services and to set a permanent plan selection hearing.  The implementation of these directions will not constitute a reexamination of an issue of fact or a retrial of the dispositional issues. 

Thus, “[b]ecause the matter was not remanded for a reexamination of an issue of fact or a retrial of the dispositional issues, we grant the petition and direct that the case be returned to [the challenged judge].”

The same considerations should not apply in the typical civil trial, where past facts are what are at issue.  But any time that future consideration of an issue will depend on facts as they then exist, “papering the judge” is apparently not an option after remand.

The first thing to jump out at me from this year’s report (in my thus far rather hasty review): the median time statewide for civil appeals (from time of filing the notice of appeal to the time of disposition) was 432 days in 2006-2007.  That’s roughly 14 months.  And 90% of all civil appeals are disposed of within 680 days, or about 22 months.  These are statewide numbers.  Some districts are better than others.

I may be wrong, but I think there is a general impression among many clients (and perhaps some trial lawyers) that appeals usually take much, much longer.  Clients dissuaded from pursuing or fighting an appeal by what they think will be “years” of more legal wrangling should think twice.

Hat tip re the report: Ben Shatz, who clues you in to some other statistical tidbits.

Their front-page article, Law School Rankings Reviewed to Deter ‘Gaming,’ discusses the practice of some schools to admit lower-qualified candidates only to their part-time programs, where the qualifications of the students do not figure into the rankings by U.S. News & World Report. The potential impact on rankings resulting from fixing the loophole might create an incentive for schools to change their practices, with negative effects for students:

Counting part-timers would roil the law-school rankings, which have a big impact on where students apply and from where law firms hire. A number of law-school administrators interviewed about the potential change contend it could have another effect: narrowing a traditional pathway to law school for minorities and working professionals. Those groups often perform worse on the important Law School Admission Test, or LSAT, and schools could feel pressure to raise their admission thresholds.

A change in criteria would “catch the outliers but punish part-time programs that have existed forever and aren’t doing it to game the system,” says Ellen Rutt, an associate law-school dean at the University of Connecticut. If U.S. News makes the move, many schools with part-time programs would have a tough choice: Leave their admission standards for part-timers unchanged, which could hurt their rank, or raise the standards, likely shrinking the programs and cutting revenue.

My own school (University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law) had a robust evening program. Even though I was a full-time student, I grew familiar with the quality of the part-time students because many of my elective classes were taught in the evening (in order to make them available to the part-time students). If there was a significant difference in the amount or quality of classroom participation by students, I sure don’t remember it. (Of course, I have no idea if the part-time students at McGeorge were any “less-qualified” on paper than my full-time classmates.)

While I don’t think rankings a