Sometimes, a judgment is a mixed bag. That’s how all the parties must have viewed the judgment in Satchmed Plaza Owners Assn. v. UWMC Hospital Corp., case no. G038119 (4th Dist. Oct. 23, 2008). The judgment enforced Satchmed’s right of first refusal with respect to 22 owned medical office units by requiring UWMC to offer them to Satchmed at a certain price. But the judgment did not require such an offer on 12 other units, which were leased. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the judgment stated that there was no prevailing party.
Mixed bags create competing incentives. Here, one incentive got the best of Satchmed.
UWMC complied with the judgment by offering the 22 offices to Satchmed, which decided to purchase them. But those other 12 units. . . well, Satchmed just couldn’t let go. And those guys at Satchmed must have thought, “Hey, if you think about it, we won on 22 of 34 units, so aren’t we the prevailing party?” So Satchmed appealed, challenging those portions of the judgment regarding the 12 units and the prevailing party determination.
Under the established doctrine that a party’s voluntary acceptance of the benefits of a judgment — or even a portion of them — precludes an appeal by that party, Satchmed’s appeal is dismissed on the ground that it waived its right to appeal by purchasing the 22 units. Satchmed claimed the doctrine did not apply because of two equally established equitable exceptions. The court not only rejected the arguments, but noted that Satchmed’s conduct was manipulative.
First, Satchmed claimed that its acceptance of the benefits was compelled, rather than voluntary, because it risked losing its right to purchase the 22 units if it appealed the judgment. After noting that Satchmed could have appealed “without fear that its right to accept UWMC’s offer would evaporate by the simple act of filing” because matters relating to enforcement of the judgment would have been automatically stayed by the appeal, the court points out the lack of any real compulsion:
The judgment did not put Satchmed at risk of losing any property it already owned. Furthermore, Satchmed was not at risk of forfeiting monies to which it was entitled by statute if it chose to prosecute an appeal. Satchmed just wanted to aggrandize its award without risk. It simply had to choose whether it wanted to file an appeal in pursuit of an even greater award than the judgment provided to it, which would entail risking a reversal of the favorable portion of the judgment, or whether it wanted to simply accept the benefit of the favorable portion of the judgment, and thereby waive the right to appeal from the unfavorable portions. Having to make a choice of this nature does not make the chosen avenue involuntary.
Second, Satchmed contended the judgment was severable, but the court find that the only facts that Satchmed relied on were created by it after the judgment, and points out that a party may not make a nonseverable judgment severable by its post-judgment actions:
[T]he portions of the judgment pertaining to the 12 leased units and the prevailing party status are not severable. Satchmed attempts to use clever timing to convert a nonseverable judgment into a severable one. We look here at the judgment at the time it was entered, before any party appealed therefrom. At that point in time, it is clear that the judgment was not severable. A ruling pertaining to the 12 leased units easily could have affected the 22 owned units, and vice versa. But Satchmed seized the portion of the judgment beneficial to itself, and took title to the 22 owned units. It then said that no ruling on the 12 leased units could possibly affect the status of the 22 owned units. In other words, it had then put the 22 owned units beyond the reach of UWMC’s attack and beyond the purview of this court. Satchmed’s claim that the judgment was then severable is essentially a claim that the judgment had become severable because Satchmed had made it so. It does not work that way. Satchmed cannot have its cake and eat it too. Having accepted the benefits of the portion of the judgment making title to the 22 owned units available to it, it cannot now attack the portion of the judgment making title to the 12 leased units unavailable to it.
In short: a judgment is either severable when entered or not. One cannot convert a severable judgment into a severable one.
Are you tempted by the juicy part of a judgment, but tempted to appeal the rest? Think it over carefully before you decide what to do, and especially think twice about maneuvering to make the facts fit within an exception to the “acceptance equals waiver” rule. It won’t pay off.