Category Archives: Ninth Circuit

July 24, 2007

The Ninth Circuit’s Reversion to 11-Judge En Banc Panels

The Ninth Circuit reverted to 11-judge en banc panels at the beginning of this month after a brief experiment with 15-judge panels.  This short article at Law.com provides some limited background on the move, including comment from one circuit judge:

“It was pretty unanimous that we were not gaining anything by going from 11 to 15 judges,” said 9th Circuit Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain, who is based in Portland, Ore. O’Scannlain, an appointee of President Ronald Reagan, said, “I would have preferred to wait until the two years were up because that is what we notified the bar we would do.”

The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that does not have every judge sit on every en banc panel.  This has been one of the size-related criticisms leveled against it.  The Ninth Circuit’s unique en banc procedure has been defended by judges from the circuit in testimony to Congress, including Judge Thomas and Judge Kozinski, each in his capacity as the en banc coordinator for the court.

Judge Thomas’s testimony in 2005 included his view that the 15-judge panels would “ameliorate” the concern that the use of only 11 judges on en banc panels results in a decision by less than a majority of the court’s judges.

Long before the court adopted the 15-judge panel, Judge Kozinski’s statement in 2003 claimed that the large size of the court was a benefit to en banc review because even though not all judges sit on the en banc panel, “[t]he fact that a large number of judges look at a decision to decide whether it should be taken en banc means that cases get a much more thorough review in a large circuit.”

As this testimony demonstrates, the debate over the size of the Ninth Circuit court has been going on for years.  And if this recent spike in blog posts about the size of the court is any indication, the debate isn’t going to end any time soon.

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Posted in: Federal Courts, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

July 20, 2007

Writ Opinions

When nearly 92% of all original proceedings in the California Court of Appeal are dismissed without written opinion (for fiscal year 2005-2006, the latest year for which statistics are provided in the 2007 Judicial Council report), it would be nice if the Court of Appeal would, in any given case, explain why that particular case made it past summary dismissal to review on the merits.  Too frequently, a writ opinion is silent on this question.

I can’t offer empirical evidence, but my observation is that the Ninth Circuit addresses this issue explicitly much more consistently in its writ opinions.  This is probably because its decisions usually evaluate the Bauman factors, as we are reminded by Douglas v. United States District Court for the Central District of California, case no. 06-75424 (July 18, 2007):

Because a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, we have developed five factors that cabin our power to grant the writ:

1. “The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires.”

2. “The petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal.”

3. “The district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law.”

4. “The district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules.”

5. “The district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.”

Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir. 1977).

I wish the California Court of Appeal was as methodical.  It would make for a much better developed body of law on when the court will exercise its discretion to review a writ petition on the merits.

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Posted in: California Court of Appeal, Ninth Circuit, Writ Review

July 16, 2007

Grandstanding Does Not Equal Intent

I watched the movie Minority Report last night.  It’s about a “precrime” department of the Washington, D.C. police department around 50 years in the future that, through the use of visions recorded from three gifted “precognitive” individuals, arrests persons for future murders they were going to commit.  The murder rate in D.C. drops to zero.  I recommend the movie, especially if you’re a sci-fi fan.

Coincidentally, today the Ninth Circuit issues United States v. Jimison, case no. 06-30417 (July 16, 2007), in which Judge Kozinski frames the issue as “when a defendant can be subject to a sentencing enhancement” under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines “for possessing a firearm in connection with an offense that he never commits.”  Specifically, the issue in this case is whether the evidence was sufficient to support an enhancement to felony firearms possession where the possession by the defendant is “with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that [the firearms] would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) (formerly § 2K2.1(b)(5)). 

The defendant, after beating up his girlfriend, stole her car.  He “stumbled upon” an unlocked ranch house from which he stole some guns, then went to a friend’s home.  Clearly distraught, he told is friend he thought he had killed his girlfriend and that he was “going to go Rambo.”  (Link added.)  Is this enough for the sentencing enhancement?

The Ninth Circuit (without benefit of precognitives, of course) says it is not enough.  The defendant’s “Rambo” remark is “an offhand comment” that “lacks sufficient specificity to establish that [defendant] formed a firm intent to shoot it out with the police.”  The court finds that lacking any evidence of context to the contrary, the defendant’s remark is the equivalent of a parent who says “I’m going to wring his neck” upon learning that is child his in trouble at school again.

It also didn’t hurt that the defendant called the owner of the guns, apologized and arranged to return them!  Why can’t all criminals be so polite?

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Posted in: Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit, Sentencing

July 13, 2007

Reduce Reversals by Splitting the Ninth Circuit?

If you’ve followed any of the debate about splitting the Ninth Circuit into two circuits, check out incoming Vanderbilt law professor Brian Fitzpatrick’s op-ed piece in the Los Angeles Times from Wednesday, in which he asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s size is partly to blame for its high reversal rate because it makes it more likely that two “extreme” judges will be assigned to the same panel:

Proponents of splitting the 9th Circuit largely have been unable, however, to connect the colossal court’s size to its high rate of reversal. But there is a connection. Indeed, it can be shown mathematically that, as a court grows larger, it is increasingly likely to issue extreme decisions.

We know that all judges are not created equal. Some are more ideologically extreme, more willing to push the law in a liberal or conservative direction, to find ways around precedents they do not like. Such extreme jurists are a minority on any federal court of appeals, but these courts don’t typically decide cases by a majority vote of their entire memberships. Rather, cases are heard by panels of three judges selected at random. So, despite their small overall numbers, extreme judges will occasionally make up a 2-1 majority.

Professor Fitzpatrick goes on to a more specific numerical analysis.

Prawfs Blawg challenges Fitzpatrick’s contention that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate indicates that it is “not doing a very good job.”  There’s some lively debate in the comments there.

This post by Jonathan Adler at The Volokh Conspiracy briefly summarizes Fitzpatrick’s piece and likewise generates some energetic discussion in the comments.

SCOTUSBlog has the most detailed statistical counter-analysis.  Again, check the comments.

Finally, the Wall Street Journal Law Blog summarizes Fitzpatrick’s piece. Do I even need to tell you to check the comments?

After reading all the comments, one conclusion is inescapable: an “extreme judge” is in the eyes of the beholder.  Now there’s a shock.

UPDATE (7/16/07): University of Richmond law professor Cullen Seltzer has a column at Slate entitled “In Defense of the 9th Circuit.” I’m guessing that all those commenters who told the Tennessee-based writer of the L.A. Times piece not to tell us how to do things in California are going to find commentary from this Virginia professor to be less objectionable.

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Posted in: Federal Courts, Ninth Circuit

July 11, 2007

When is a Probation Officer a Judge? When You Lie to Him.

Opinions from the Ninth Circuit are often summed up pretty well in the first paragraph.  Yesterday’s decision in United States v. Horvath, case no. 06-30447 (July 10, 2007) is a case in point:

Any person who knowingly and willfully makes a materially false statement to the federal government is subject to criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).  Congress chose to exempt from liability, however, false statements submitted to a judge by a party to a judicial proceding.  18 U.S.C. § 1001(b).  We must decide whether the exception in § 1001(b) for “statements . . . submitted by [a] party . . . to a judge” encompasses a false statement submitted to the judge in a presentence report (“PSR”), when the defendant in a criminal proceeding made the false statement to the probation officer during the defendant’s presentence interview, rather than to the judge directly.  We hold that when, but only when, the probation officer is required by law to include such a statement in the PSR and to  submit the PSR to the judge, the statement falls within the exception in § 1001(b).  We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.

What was the lie?  The Defendant told the probation officer that he had been in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1986 to 1991, achieved the rank of Sergeant (E-5), and was awarded the Purple Heart during service in Panama.

As someone who really was in the Marine Corps (1982-1987), this makes me a little mad.  If I had been a noncommissioned officer instead of an officer, I’d be even madder.  (You know the line from movies even if you weren’t in the service: “I’m not an officer.  I work for a living.”)  If I had received a Purple Heart for wounds . . . well, madder yet.

On the bright side, the decision recognizes that lying about military service is a material misrepresentation  in this context.  The defendant just isn’t criminally liable in this case despite the materiality of the misrepresentation.

Other blog coverage of the case:

Professor Shaun Martin has some kind words at California Appellate Report for the respectful tone of the dissent.  So does Brian McDonough at Legal Pad, who also provides a more detailed and somewhat humorous analysis.

Howard Bashman at How Appealing notes one of the main points of the dissent.

UPDATE (7/12/07): Ninth Circuit Blog has a take on the case.

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Posted in: Criminal Law, Ninth Circuit

July 2, 2007

Ninth Circuit Rules Amendments Available

Amendments to the Ninth Circuit rules went into effect on July 1, 2007.  They are available for download as a PDF from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals website.  It’s a handy file, with a chart of the changes and revised or added language clearly highlighted.

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Posted in: Appellate Procedure, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

June 18, 2007

Ninth Circuit Allows 35-Year-Old Conduct to Enhance Child Porn Conviction

The decision begins: “This appeal tests the temporal and relational limits of prior conduct as a sentencing enhancement.”  That seems to be putting it mildly.  In U.S. v. Garner, case no. 06-10417 (June 18, 2007), the Ninth Circuit allows the defendant’s sexual abuse of his children more than 35 years ago to be considered in enhancing his sentence for attempted receipt and distribution of child pornography.  The court finds no time or relationship limitations built into the “pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor” requirement for enhancement under section 2G2.2(b)(5) of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Nothing from Ninth Circuit Blog yet (which is almost certain to weigh in on this), but Professor Martin notes that the 22-year sentence means Garner will die in prison.

One wonders if this has to be some sort of record.  The oldest conduct utilized for enhancement in any of the cases cited by the court was 26 years before the conviction.

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Posted in: Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit, Sentencing

June 11, 2007

Elaborate Hoax Upheld as Constitutional Seizure

I was tied up with some things Friday and missed an early review of a Ninth Circuit opinion filed that day in which the court finds an elaborate hoax staged to seize a vehicle is constitutional. If you missed it, too, this teaser from the concurring opinion should interest you in U.S. v. Alverez-Tejeda, case no. 06-30289 (June 8, 2007);

The staged collision, “theft” of the car (and all of its contents), car chase and search of Alverez-Tejeda’s apparently innocent companion had the potential to spin out of control and exceed reasonable bounds. Nonetheless, on the record before us I agree with my colleagues that the agents’ ruse stayed within bounds (even if they pushed the envelope in some respects). Although we do not sustain the district court’s thoughtful analysis, I do not thereby mean to endorse this police action as a model for future creative seizures.

The staging is best described in the words of the opinion:

Read the full article »

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Posted in: Criminal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

June 1, 2007

Ninth Circuit Panel Splits on Appellate Jurisdiction over Denial of FSIA Immunity Claimed via Res Judicata

The Ninth Circuit tackles a question of appellate jurisdiction in Gupta v. Thai Airways International, case no. 04-56389 (May 30, 2007).  The riddle — which the majority overlooks until it responds to the dissent — arises from the intersection of res judicata and the “collateral order” exception to the final judgment rule.

Thai Airways contended in its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the district court that it was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the airline is 76% owned by the Thai government) .  The airline contended that an identical state court action brought by Gupta was res judicata on this issue because it was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on FSIA immunity grounds.  It also argued the merits of FSIA immunity independently of its res judicata argument.  The district court rejected both arguments, finding that the prior ruling was not res judicata because it did not go to the merits of the dispute and that an exception to the FSIA applied.

On appeal, however, the airline did not assert the district court erred in its determination that an exception to the FSIA applied.  It relied exclusively on its res judicata argument. 

This turns out to be what splits the dissent from the majority on appeal.

The Ninth Circuit (and its sister circuits) have long recognized the appealability of an order denying a motion to dismiss based on FSIA immunity.  The majority classifies this as such an appeal, and thus asserts jurisdiction under this well-established exception to the final judgment rule.

The issue becomes thornier when you read the dissent, in which Judge Tashima argues that the court must examine “each claim or issue presented separately to determine their jurisdiction on interlocutory appeal.”  Conceding that he would find jurisdiction over the issue of whether the district court erred in finding that the FSIA exception applied, Judge Tashima contends that the res judicata issue is sufficiently distinct to take it outside the rule allowing review of orders denying FSIA immunity:

While it is true that our case law permits an immediate interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss based on foreign sovereign immunity, it is equally well-settled that the denial of a motion to dismiss based on res judicata grounds is not immediately appealable.

***

Although the cases discussing the collateral order doctrine sometimes loosely refer to interlocutory orders as being appealable, in fact, the cases actually analyze the specific claim or issue presented in determining the scope of their jurisdiction on an interlocutory appeal. And each claim presented must independently meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine in order for it to be considered on interlocutory appeal. Appellate jurisdiction over one claim rejected in a district court order does not confer jurisdiction over all other claims rejected in the same order.(Citations omitted, emphasis in original.)

It seems clear that had the airline appealed on both grounds, Judge Tashima would assert jurisdiction over the merits of the FSIA immunity claim but not over the res judicata argument for the same claim of immunity. 

This is too much hair-splitting for the majority, which responds in a footnote to its statement that “It is from this order that Thai Airways is appealing.”  (Emphasis in original.) The majority contends that the dissent relies on a false premise that the FSIA immunity issue and res judicata issues are distinct.  It says that since the res judicata issue involves and is based solely on FSIA immunity, and is indeed determinative on the issue, the appeal falls within the rule of appealability under the collateral order doctrine for orders denying FSIA immunity.

Whatever the asserted ground of error, the majority has a point that in the end, the order appealed from determined that there was no FSIA immunity.  And that is all they needed to bring it within the well-established exception to the final judgment rule.

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Posted in: Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

May 31, 2007

The Proper Action When an Appeal is Mooted

Offering a concise lesson on when a moot federal appeal should be dismissed and when it shouldn’t is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council of the State of California, case no. 02-17413 (May 30, 2007). 

Fearing that new standards for California arbitrators imposed by the Judicial Council would make its arbitrations in California more difficult, NASD and the New York Stock Exchange sought a declaratory judgment that the California standards were preempted by federal securities laws, could not constitutionally be applied to the plaintiffs’ arbitration programs, and were not applicable to those programs as a matter of state law.  The district court dismissed the suit on the ground that the defendants were state entities with Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.

The plaintiffs appealed. In an intervening decision in another case the Ninth Circuit held that the California standards were preempted by federal securities law, and the California Supreme Court reached a similar holding in yet another case involving different parties.  These intervening cases rendered the present appeal moot.

The issue before the court was whether, in light of the appeal’s mootness, the court should vacate the trial court’s dismissal of the case or instead let the trial court judgment stand and dismiss the appeal.  The state defendants did not want the trial court ruling disturbed, since it held that the Judicial Council and its members were immune from suit in federal court. 

The usual action in the event of a moot appeal is to vacate the decision below with a direction to dismiss, which is what the court does here.  Generally, only when mootness is the result of conduct by the party seeking appellate relief — such as by settling on appeal — should the court dismiss and leave the judgment below intact.  This sufficiently serves the public interest by protecting the district court decision against “a refined form of collateral attack” — an appellant settling on appeal so as to have the judgment below vacated.

The Judicial Council urged that equity and public policy weighed against vacatur because NASD and NYSE were unlikely to sue the Council or its members again, and the public has an interest in preserving judicial precedent.  The court spends a short time on the value of district court opinions as “precedent” and the effect of a “vacated on other grounds” history for a district court case. Since the district court decision will remain in the Federal Supplement and is useful only as persuasive authority anyway, the public interest in preservation of precedent does not require that the ruling remain intact.

This last point is especially sensible and relevant to the discussion in this earlier post regarding the utility of citing district court decisions.

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Posted in: Appellate Procedure, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

May 31, 2007

Processing Irony in a Ninth Circuit Equal Protection Case

Circuit Judge Berzon hooked me with this opening paragraph of U.S. v. Trimble, case no. 06-30298 (May 30, 2007):

The Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791. The United States produced its first automobile in 1877, and the first traffic ticket issued in 1904.

This appeal to the Ninth Circuit was over a traffic ticket. Specifically, the penalty imposed for the violations as a result of the form of ticket used. Notwithstanding the minor nature of the offenses, the case implicates a major constitutional doctrine — equal protection.

Trimble was ticketed on a military base. The officer who wrote Trimble’s ticket did so on a brand new form that imposed a $25 processing fee in addition to any fine. Because of a shortage of the new forms, other officers at the exact same time were still writing tickets on the old form of ticket, which made no mention of a processing fee. At her court appearance, the fine imposed on Trimble included the processing fee on three violations (for a total of $75). She appealed, claiming that the imposition of the processing fee based solely on the form of ticket written violated the equal protection clause. The court agrees.

The irony? The $25 processing charge was instituted, according to the court, “to offset the costs of managing petty offense cases in the federal courts.” Yet Trimble invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit, and successfully avoids the fee that was intended to offset the costs of routine federal court management.

On the equal protection issue, the court finds no rational basis for allowing different penalties despite its “excursion into imaginative recreation of possible justifications.”

Professor Shaun Martin isn’t sure the court exhausted the possibilities and is taken aback at the resources poured into an appeal over $75. His post at California Appellate Report ends (emphasis in original):

But let me add one more thing. Seventy five dollars. For that we appoint a public defender and have a U.S. attorney and the P.D. brief and argue an entire appeal? We can’t just save some money by confessing error and refunding the piddly seventy-five bucks?

Perhaps in the long run it will turn out to be money well spent. Professor Berman at Sentencing Law and Policy thinks the case may have broader implications:

Based on a quick read, I am not entirely sure whether the Trimble holding might provide a basis for questioning other sorts of criminal justice “injuries large and small.” Any readers have any suggestions or creative litigation thoughts?

Anyone who wants to respond to Professor Berman should go to his post.

Howard Bashman at How Appealing suggests that “the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts might wish to adjust its revenue projections to reflect that it won’t be receiving a $25 processing fee” for tickets issued at the base.

Small stakes, big issue, interesting case.

UPDATE: (5/31/07): A short post on this case at the Volokh Conspracy gathers some interesting comments. Decision of the Day also wrote up this one, and follows up with a post today that suggests the first circuit isn’t so solicitous of small cases.

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Posted in: Equal Protection, Ninth Circuit

May 29, 2007

Child Pornographer Remains Anonymous In Ninth Circuit Ruling – and Limits His Restitution Exposure by Exploiting Developing World Victims (Updated)

Appellate Law & Practice and Decision of the Day both report on what the latter calls a “remarkable decision” today from the Ninth Circuit. Both write about the fact that in United States v. Doe, case no. 05-50474 (May 29, 2007), the Ninth Circuit allows the defendant — a child pornographer who pleaded guilty to molesting and photographing young teen boys on his trips outside the U.S. — to remain anonymous in the disposition of the appeal.

Both bloggers recognize that anonymity was probably a condition of the defendant’s guilty plea (although the decision never says). Decision of the Day is appalled that the circuit judges would allow this, especially in light of their reputations:

Shame on the prosecutors and the courts for allowing a criminal defendant to remain anonymous, especially in light of the fact that this was his fourth time getting caught with kiddie porn. Neither the district judge – GWB appointee Klausner – nor the three appellate panelists – Reagan appointees O’Scannlain and Hall and GWB appointee Callahan – have a reputation for being generous with criminal defendants.

“S. COTUS” at Appellate Law & Practice takes a slightly different view –

Perhaps these appointees wanted to make things easier for a prosecutor, or the so-called “victims.” In reality, there are a lot of sealed proceedings out there, but usually both sides agree to it, and I suspect that these judges were well-aware of this, and didn’t want to rock the boat.

The so called victims? I’ll get to that later. Back to anonymity for now.

The court notes that allowing the use of a pseudonym is reserved for “exceptional cases where necessary to protect a person from injury or harassment.” But the judges never tell us how that standard applies in this case. In fact, the whole issue of anonymity rates no more than a footnote in the opinion. The defendant made a motion for the disposition to be filed using a pseudonym, and instead of explaining why this was necessary, the court merely continues the sealed nature of the proceedings begun in the district court. Unless they could not discuss this without imposing the harm they sought to avoid through use of the synonym, why did they avoid this discussion? The docket shows no separate order on the motion.

The defendant’s anonymity seems especially inappropriate in light one of his assertions of error: that the victim statements in the pre-sentencing report were anonymous! He loses on this issue, though.

While he also loses on the issue of whether he should have to pay the restitution ordered by the district court, it’s somewhat shocking to see that the restitution the court affirms amounts to $16,475 total for eight victims – about $2,060 per victim. Amazingly, this includes two years of monthly counseling, vocational training (to make up for some of the victims having to leave school), and a management fee to the organization coordinating the services. For traveling abroad to an unnamed “developing world” country, Doe gets bargain basement restitution costs — then complains about them.

Doe is sentenced to 204 months. As for “S. COTUS’s” reference to “so-called ‘victims’ ” — read the excerpt from the plea agreement, then see if you agree.

UPDATE (5/30/07): “S. COTUS” at Appellate Law and Practice has updated his post to explain why he used the term “so-called ‘victims.’ ” He concedes that the children in this case were genuine victims. He makes a decent case for attributing it to carelessness, and I take him at his word.

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Posted in: Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

May 25, 2007

Conflict with Appellate Counsel Doesn’t Merit Habeas Relief

In Foote v. Del Papa, case no. 06-15094 (May 22, 2007), the Ninth Circuit holds that a state criminal defendant’s “irreconcilable conflict” with appellate counsel does not, in itself, entitle the state defendant to habeas relief.

Foote filed suit against his assigned attorney and the public defender’s office a month after his arraignment, claiming that his assigned defender’s handling of the case deprived him of his Constitutional rights. The public defender’s office moved to withdraw, claiming the lawsuit created a “clear conflict of interest.” After sentencing, the state trial court granted the request of Foote’s retained counsel to assign the public defender to represent Foote on appeal. Foote’s direct appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court was dismissed, and that court also declined his state habeas petition, characterizing the alleged conflict of interest as a potential conflict only.

Foote’s federal habeas petition alleged ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of th conflict of interest. He claimed the public defender failed to raise meritorious appellate issues and never responded to his demand to withdraw and ask for the appointment of independent counsel counsel.

The Ninth Circuit denies the petition because it is an “open question” whether the defendant’s conflict of interest with appellate counsel violates the Sixth Amendment. Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), habeas relief cannot be granted unless the decision of the state court is “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Since the Supreme Court has never held that a conflict with appellate counsel violates the Sixth Amendment, habeas relief is denied.

This is an unsettling decision because the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning denies relief even assuming the alleged conflict of interest actually exists. Though it recognizes that an “irreconcilable conflict” between defendant and trial counsel may entitle the defendant to new trial counsel, the lack of a comparable Supreme Court holding with respect to appellate counsel means that habeas relief must be denied.

Is this distinction between trial counsel and appellate counsel splitting hairs?

The Ninth Circuit Blog says that “This “Foote-note” to the Sixth Amendment seems too narrow as it is not a large step from trial counsel to appellate counsel.”

Likewise, anonymouos blogger “J” at the The AEDPA Law and Policy Blog says:

I’m not an expert on this particular area of the 6th Amendment. That being said, isn’t there an argument that the 6th Amendment rights of a defendant at trial are the same as his 6th Amendment rights during his first appeal as of right vis-a-vis the right to conflict-free representation? If that is correct, then wouldn’t the failure to provide conflict-free counsel based on the difference between the trial and the first appeal implicate the “unreasonable application of” prong? (Emphasis in original.)

I tend to agree. Why should a distinction be drawn between trial counsel and appellate counsel in this situation? The Ninth Circuit doesn’t even attempt to draw one, even though it relies on the distinction to establish the lack of controlling Supreme Court precedent.

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Posted in: Habeas Corpus, Ninth Circuit

May 23, 2007

Rockin’ the Boat after a Trademark Settlement

The ephemeral nature of trademark litigation comes out in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Moose Creek, Inc., case no. 06-56774 (May 22, 2007). In 2004, Moose Creek sued Abercrombie, alleging that Abercrombie’s silhouette moose trademark infringed Moose Creek’s moose trademarks. Abercrombie, of course, claimed there was no likelihood of confusion between the marks.

The same year, while the action was pending, Abercrombie started using a new “outline” moose trademark in addition to its silhouette moose mark. The parties settled the lawsuit with an agreement that allowed each of them to continue using their marks.

After the case settled, Moose Creek started using two new moose trademarks, and now it was Abercrombie’s turn to allege infringement. Now making the argument in favor of likelihood of confusion under the venerable 8-factor analysis of AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats , 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), several of Abercrombie’s arguments were challenged as factually inconsistent with those it made in the first lawsuit, and the district court held that Abercrombie was thus judicially estopped from making those arguments.

The Ninth Circuit finds that the district court was within its discretion to preclude arguments on two of the Sleekcraft factors but abused its discretion by precluding arguments on two others. The parties’ reversal of position — Abercrombie having the senior mark this time, and Moose Creek having the junior mark — is instrumental in the analysis, as it changes the focus of inquiry regarding the relevant field of marks and which party’s customer base is the appropriate focus for evaluating likely confusion. On the other hand, two Sleekcraft factors — marketing channels and the likelihood of expansion in the product lines — are unaffected by the parties’ flip-flop in junior and senior status, and thus inconsistent arguments from Abercrombie are precluded absent an actual change in underlying facts. The court declines to reverse the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against Moose Creek’s use of the marks, instead remanding to the district court for reconsideration in light of the arguments previously precluded.

All that said, this case caught my interest because of the business decision, not the legal one. My question: What the heck was Moose Creek thinking when it came out with two new moose marks? It already had a settlement agreement in place allowing it to continue using the old marks (which presumably continued to strengthen with time), and it knew that any new marks would be junior to Abercrombie’s marks, making them a potential litigatgion target. There must have been a strong market factor at work to justify the risk of litigation. My two cents to Moose Creek: when you settle this one, make sure you can live for a long, long time with the marks the agreement lets you continue to use.

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Posted in: Ninth Circuit, Trademark

May 17, 2007

More Googlelaw

Perfect 10 publishes photographs of nude women and owns the copyrights in those images.  Google displays thumbnails of those images in its image search results.  Perfect 10 says this is infringement and obtains a preliminary injunction against the practice, but the Ninth Circuit, in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., case no. 06-55405 (May 16, 2007), reverses.

The most written about aspect of the decision is the court’s finding that Google’s display of thumbnail images in its image search results constitutes a non-infringing “fair use” of the images.  Since Perfect 10 failed to show that it was likely to overcome Google’s fair use defense, the court reverses the grant of preliminary inunction.

Kevin O’Keefe of Lexblog says that the decision is “[f]urther evidence that Google is rewriting American copyright law (not saying good or bad).”  It certainly gathered some attention, with bloggers writing about the case at How Appealing, Appealing in Nevada, and Decision of the Day.

Professor Orin Kerr at The Volokh Conspiracy calls it “Another Clash Between Virtual And Physical Perspectives in Internet Law,” and I agree that is one of the more interesting aspects of the case.  I also think the decision does a very good job of distinguishing between the virtual and physical display of an image.  Professor Kerr’s post links to a law review article of his on this issue of perspective.

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Posted in: Copyright, Internet Law, Ninth Circuit

May 16, 2007

Legal Blogosphere Reacts as Ninth Circuit Puts the Brakes on CDA Immunity for Online Services

Yesterday’s Ninth Circuit decision in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, case no. 04-56916 (May 15, 2007) has the digital legal world abuzz . . . as one should expect of the latest decision on the scope of immunity afforded to online services by the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).

In this case, two municipal fair housing councils sued Roommates.com, an online clearinghouse for those seeking to obtain roommates or move in as one. They alleged that the website published discriminatory roommate preferences in violation of the Fair Housing Act and various state laws. The district court found Roommates immune under the CDA and granted summary judgment on the FHA claim.

Judge Kozinski’s majority opinion succinctly summarized the bounds of immunity under the CDA:

In other words, if Roommate passively publishes information provided by others, the CDA protects it from liability that would otherwise attach under state or federal law as a result of such publication. But if it is responsible, in whole or in part, for creating or developing the information, it becomes a content provider and is not entitled to CDA immunity. (Footnote omitted.)

The majority opinion then finds that Roommates lacks immunity under the CDA for publishing and e-mailing member profiles containing members’ gender, sexuality, and children information and preferences, which it collects from its members via an interactive, drop-down menu registration process. But it finds that Roommates is immune from liability for publishing the free-form comments submitted by its members. Concurring and dissenting, Judge Reinhardt would also find immunity lacking for the latter publication.

Some bloggers suggest a possible relationship to anti-blogging sentiment recently expressed by Judge Kozinski. Howard Bashman at How Appealing says this “decision screwing-up the protection from liability for online postings” might have been foreshadowed by “Judge Kozinski’s recent expression of anti-blogger sentiment,” to which he links. David Lat at Above the Law headlines his post about the case: “Does Judge Kozinski Hate Blogs?” University of San Diego School of Law Professor Shaun Martin, blogging at California Appellate Report, spies a “tangential slam on bloggers” in footnote 1 of the opinion, but doesn’t seriously tie the decision to anti-blogging bias.

In a subsequent post, Bashman links to an article about the case that will appear in Wednesday’s New York Times.

UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh at The Volokh Conspiracy has two posts about the case. The first is a detailed analysis of the decision. His second is a commentary on the (un)constitutionality of limiting free speech and free intimate association rights to advertise for and select a roommate of one’s choice.

Professor Eric Goldman of the Santa Clara University School of Law, blogging at Technology and Marketing Law Blog headlines his take “Ninth Circuit Screws Up 47 USC 230.” He sees a “180” being pulled by the court:

Just a couple months ago, in Perfect 10 v. CCBill, the Ninth Circuit issued an incredibly expansive 230 ruling. Today, in a highly fractured opinion, they go in the completely opposite direction, creating a significant exception to 230’s coverage that’s bound to spur plenty of new unmeritorious and ill-advised lawsuits from plaintiffs. Why the 180? Such is life in the Ninth Circuit.

The Decision of the Day blog provides analysis supporting its opinion that the “decision suggests that § 230 may be a lot narrower than some websites would like.”

Bashman’s and Goldman’s posts suggest ramifications for pending suits against DontDateHimGirl.com and the insanely popular Craig’s List.

Thanks to the bloggers mentioned above for providing many of the links.

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Posted in: Appellate Blogs, First Amendment, Internet Law, Judges, Ninth Circuit

May 16, 2007

Claim Challenging Removal of Cross from County Seal Fails in Ninth Circuit

In 2004, under legal threat from the American Civil Liberties Union, Los Angeles County removed from its official seal an image of a cross (which shared the seal with the Roman goddess Pamona, engineering instruments, a Spanish galleon, a tuna, a cow, oil derricks, the Hollywood Bowl, and two stars representing the area’s motion picture and television industries).  It replaced the cross with a depiction of the first Spanish mission established in the county (which depiction did not include a cross), and made other changes to the seal.  Plaintiff Ernesto R. Vasquez, an employee of the County of Los Angeles, filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the removal of the cross from the seal violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it conveyed, in the words of the Ninth Circuit, a “state-sponsored message of hostility toward Christians.”  The County moved to dismiss, and the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit affirms in Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, case no. 04-56973 (May 15, 2007). (The “before” and “after” seals are appendices to the opinion but are provided in a separate PDF file here.)  The court finds that Vasquez has standing because he is a county employee that has frequent regular contact with the offending county seal.  It also ruled that the claim was not mooted by the inclusion of the Spanish mission as a substitute for the cross, finding that the district court’s conclusion to the contrary, based on its rationale that substitution of one Christian symbol for another could not be considered hostile to Christianity, confused mootness with the merits of the case.

That’s where plaintiff’s luck runs out.  The court turned next to the oft-vilified Lemon test (Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)), under which a government action is consistent with the Establishment Clause if it: (1) has a secular purpose; (2) has a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor disapproves of religion; and (3) does not foster excessive governmental entanglement with religion.  Reaching beyond the pleadings, the court concludes that the cross was removed from the seal for the secular purpose of avoiding threatened litigation over an alleged Establishment Clause violation and that the purpose of the removal was to restore neutrality.  Finally, it rejects plaintiff’s contention that the political divisiveness arising from the controversy was sufficient to plead excessive entanglement.

Perhaps I have greater interest in this case because I live in a neighboring county and closely followed the original controversy over the cross and seal as it developed, but I am surprised to find only one other blog post about it.  That post is here at the “Decision of the Day.”  (It’s also possible that bloggers will pay more attention to this case in the coming days but were too busy posting about the Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC case, which also came out yesterday and, as I posted earlier today, took the legal blogosphere by storm.)

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Posted in: Federal Courts, Jurisdiction, Ninth Circuit

May 14, 2007

FRCP Amendments Approved and Transmitted to Congress

The Supreme Court approved amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and transmitted those amendments to Congress on April 30.  They will take effect December 1, 2007 unless Congress legislates their rejection, modification, or deferral. 

Rules 1-86 were “restyled” — revised with the intent to make them easier to read and understand without substantively changing them.  For example, rule 59, governing new trial motions, is amended so subsection (a) is changed from a single, lengthy paragraph into paragraphs (a)(1)(A), (a)(1)(B), and (a)(2).  Not only easier on the eyes, but much easier to comprehend.

The amendments contain substantive changes as well, but none directly relating to the rules regarding entry of judgment and post-trial practice.

Helpful links to the advisory committee reports, including a side-by-side run-down of the style changes between old and proposed new rules, are provided here and here courtesy of Professors Counsellor and Ryan at Baylor Law School (blogging at Civil Procedure Prof Blog), and Professor Spencer at the University of Richmond School of Law (blogging at Federal Civil Practice Bulletin), respectively.

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Posted in: Appeals, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

May 10, 2007

A Chemistry Lesson Resolves an Issue of First Impression in a Drug Case

In U.S. v. Hollis, case no. 05-30611 (May 7, 2007), the Ninth Circuit holds that under the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), under which “any fact [other than the fact of a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt,” a defendant charged with distribution of a controlled substance (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)) cannot be subject to the higher sentencing standard for distribution of a “cocaine base” with a prior felony drug conviction (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)) unless the government pleads and proves that the cocaine base in issue is “crack” cocaine.  Citing earlier opinions for facts about the manufacture of cocaine powder and cocaine base, the court concludes that the two are “chemically identical,” and thus the term “cocaine base” in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)) must mean “crack” in order to distinguish it from powder cocaine.  Nonetheless, the court upholds the conviction because the error was harmless in light of “overwhelming and uncontradicted evidence at trial that the substance Hollis distributed was crack.”

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Posted in: Criminal Law, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

May 4, 2007

New FRAP and Ninth Circuit Rules Available

The Ninth Circuit website has posted the latest version (May 2007) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Local Circuit Rules.  They can be downloaded here. Maybe I shouldn’t look a gift horse in the mouth, but it would be nice if the PDF file had internal links to make it a little easier to jump from one rule to another referenced within it, or from the table of contents to the listed rule.  But this PDF file is a nice resource nonetheless.

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Posted in: Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

April 30, 2007

The Ninth Circuit’s Split Personality on Deadline for Removal

Professor A. Robert Benjamin of the University of Richmond School of Law runs a blog every federal practitioner should love. The Split Circuits blog is a fine resource on — you guessed it — splits among the federal circuits. In a post earlier this month, Professor Benjamin pointed out a split of authority within the Ninth Circuit on the deadline for removing a state court lawsuit to federal court. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), the notice of removal must be filed

within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

The deadline becomes a thorny issue when multiple defendants are served at different times. Some district courts in the Ninth Circuit hold that the date of the first service is the trigger, others hold that the last date of service controls. Professor Benjamin’s post quotes extensively from Coleman v. Assurant, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Nev. 2006), which discusses this split.

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Posted in: Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

April 30, 2007

Ninth Circuit: Prior Conviction of Any Age May be Used to Enhance Sentence for Illegal Entry

Joining the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit holds that there is no limit on the age of convictions that may be used under section 2L.1.2 of the 2003 Sentencing Guidelines to enhance a sentence on a conviction for entering or remaining in the United States illegally. The defendant in this case was apprehended in 2003 and the trial court correctly considered convictions from 1972 and 1976. The case is United States v. Olmos-Esparza, Ninth Circuit case no. 06-50276 (April 24, 2007).

UPDATE: Jon Sands at Ninth Circuit Blog gives his detailed take on the case here.

CORRECTION: The author at Ninth Circuit Blog is Steve Kalar, posting here.

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Posted in: Criminal Law, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit, Sentencing

April 30, 2007

When is a Bankruptcy Court Order an Appealable Final Judgment?

The Ninth Circuit gives a good summary of the rules applicable to this question in In re Brown, case no. 05-15605 (April 26, 2007). The court held that a minute order granting a creditor’s motion for summary judgment in an adversary action was an interim order that did not constitute a final judgment and thus did not trigger the time for debtor to appeal. The case gives excellent guidance for evaluating the language of an order and the procedural posture of the case as aids in determining appealability.

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Posted in: Appellate Jurisdiction, Appellate Procedure, Bankruptcy, Federal Procedure, Ninth Circuit

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